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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a primer for a combat analysis course for Joint Command,
Control and Communications students at the Naval Postgraduate School. It
provides a single document which ties together the key concepts of combat
modeling and analysis.
The thesis introduces various aspects of combat models and illustrates many
of their functions, applications and results with examples. Areas included in the
primer are: combat theory and the relationship of command and control within that
theory, modeling techniques, measures of effectiveness, attrition models, other
forms of non-attrition analysis and examples of models currently in use.
The thesis introduces basic concepts and identifies readings from which those
concepts were extracted. It does not teach students to develop combat models,
although it gives insight into how the application affects proper model selection.
Acce.Iion For
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis is designed to be a primer for CC3001, a combat modeling course
at the Naval Postgraduate School for students in the Joint Command, Control and
Communications (C3) curriculum. It provides the students with a single document
that ties together the concepts that the course is designed to teach.
The purpose of this course is to give C3 students a background in combat
modeling and analysis. For instance, one use of a combat model is a "decision
aid" for a commander who needs to make some kind of operational or tactical
decision affecting the troops under his control. Therefore, it is important for
students of C3 to look at how these models are constructed and how analyses are
utilized.
Command itself is evidenced in every aspect of military activity across the
spectrum from peace to war. It is not surprising, therefore, that "Command and
Control" are seen from many perspectives:
"* All levels of policy, strategy, campaigns (or operational art) and tactics,
"* Relationships with leadership and management skills,
"* As a function to be performed, as a dynamic process, and as a system of
tangible and intangible elements.
Moreover, there are current, authoritative documents dealing with one or
more aspects of command and control. These documents characterize their own
subjects as concepts, programs, structures or doctrine. Older doctrinal
publications aside, these new publications fall under self-styled subjects variously
denoted as C2W, C41, C4I for the Warriot, and Information Warfare. Depending
• i • J J
on the issuing agency's authority and responsibility, they emphasize organization,
equipment, requirements, procurement, training or operations, either singly or in
combination. Some of these documents have indistinct boundaries between
wartime and peacetime decision making, the conduct of operations,
communications, the use of computers, and intelligence as an organization or
intelligence as information. In addition, the domain of applicability and
distinction are sometimes unclear between the processes of gathering information,
of transmitting it, of using it, and of denying it to the enemy. Inevitably, physical
attacks against enemy means of command and active defense of one's own -- thus
the actions of combat itself -- enter into some of the activities the documents
espouse.
Some of these documents will be studied in subsequent courses. A brief
introduction to some of them at the end of Chapter I, will give the student a sense
of the sweeping nature of their subject matter, and the variety of perspectives they
contain.
Through active duty, most students have acquired a working knowledge of
many aspects of command and control and appreciate the problem of describing it
so that it can be modeled and analyzed. While horizons were broadened in the
introductory course, CC 3000, the C' student will be exposed to many more
aspects in subsequent courses, principally with the objective of providing a
grounding in the design of C' (i.e., communications) systems architecture and the
development of C' systems.
In Chapter II of this primer, command and control will be described and
structured broadly as a function, a process and a system. The structure serves two
purposes. One is to give the student a very broad framework with which to
2
compare the many approaches to command in current, operative documents. Since
current approaches are not mutually consistent in all respects and in some respects
are irreconcilable, the substance Af Chaptcr II necessarily has its own perspective,
although it will be seen that insofar as possible, it will conform to common usage
and official statements. In time, the student will of course reach his or her own
conclusions as to the best fundamental way to think about and analyze specific C2
and combat problems. In the meantime, Chapter II is to be taken as "doctrinal" for
purposes of this course.
The objective of this course is not, however, to model and analyze command
and control systems. Its objective is to introduce a variety of models and methods
that describe and analyze the processes of combat. Therefore, the second purpose
of Chapter II is to outline a structure describing combat itself. The combat theory
includes "command-control" (C2) as one process. "Command-control" is the
activity that governs all other combat activities under a commander's perview.
Another process is "command-control countermeasures" which a commander
employs to interfere with enemy command and control activities.
For obvious reasons, the theory of combat is not intended to teach how to win
battles. Theory is intended to describe the phenomena of combat so they can be
understood. Military analysts understand the wisdom of an old saying that goes:
"It's not 'Let's model some battles so we can understand them,' but instead, 'Let's
understand how battles are fought so we can model them."'
Subsequent chapters of the Reader, which contain additional course reading
assignments, will address combat modeling and analysis, with more-than-usual
attention paid to the role of command and communications. In other words, the
objective of CC 3001 is to introduce a variety of models and analytical techniques,
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past and present, that describe the dynamic processes of combat and military
operations with enough suitability and fidelity to use for decision making. The
course treats analysis of operations and battles, not the modeling of the C2 process;
it is about making better decisions, rather than the decision process.
This course outline is divided into nine chapters which deal with separate
issues of combat modeling. Chapter II develops a theory of combat to give
students a common reference for dealing with combat phenomena. Also in
Chapter II is a structure for discussing C2 that is based on the theory of combat
presented. In Chapter III, the student is introduced to the various types of
modeling, and the modeling process. Chapter IV deals with selection of measures
of effectiveness (MOE), performance (MOP) and force effectiveness (MOFE). In
Chapter V, the student is introduced to attrition modeling techniques using
Lanchester-type attrition equations. Chapter VI examines the evolution of naval
combat and the attrition models that best emulated combat at sea through history.
In Chapter VII, non-attrition models are examined and contrasted with the attrition
models previously studied. Chapter VIII looks at the current "state of the art,"
including several combat models located at the Naval Postgraduate School and
elsewhere, which have been used for extensive research. A summary is presented
in Chapter IX to review the concepts presented and examine the material in view
of the follow-on courses the student of Command, Control and Communications
will take.
Each chapter begins with an introduction that outlines the objectives of the
chapter in simple bullet statements. Outside readings, which supplement the
lectures and are contained in the Reader, are listed next. Following the list,
objectives are discussed in more detail in order to provide the student with the
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general idea behind each objective, so that the student will have a feeling for the
important material contained in the readings and how the objectives are related to
one another. At the end of each chapter, there is a section on how the chapter
relates to other courses within the C3 curriculum. Finally, there are review
questions which should help the student test him/herself on the material presented.
The reading assignment for this chapter is the Fred T. Case paper, "Analysis
of Air Operations During Desert Shield/Desert Storm." In 1990, the US Air Force
Center for Studies and Analyses completed work on the C31SIM model. It was
designed to be a tool for analysts' use in the study of Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence (C3I) related issues. Its first actual use was in
the study of drug smuggling activities. However, on 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded
Kuwait and soon after the United States began its build-up for Desert
Shield/Desert Storm. Consequently, the C3ISIM model's designers began
investigating how the model could be adapted for use in the war as a campaign
decision aid.
"Analysis of Air Operations During Desert Shield/Desert Storm" is presented
in order to acquaint the student with 1) an actual "working" model, 2) the
processes and procedures required to design, and in this case redesign, a model
with a real operational purpose, and 3) some introductory terms and theories used
in combat modeling.
5
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11. COMMAND AND CONTROL & COMBAT THEORY
AIM:
Provide the student a background in combat theory, analysis and modeling.
Present the student with an internally consistent theory of combat. Present
definitions of C' and C3 that support the combat theory. Explore the role of
combat analysis in making C2 decisions to support effective combat.
OBJECTIVES:
* Introduce the role of combat analysis as it applies to command and control
decision making
* Explain a theory of combat
* Def'me and illustrate two means of "force"
* Discuss combat processes and how these processes have measurable
results
• Define two different types of combat potential: designed and
available
• Link the concept of combat power on two sides with measurable
results and outcome of a battle
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Present the fundamental equation of combat power
Provide definitions of Command and Control as a framework for
applying the theory of combat
* Define (1) command, (2) command-control and (3) a C2
system
* Discuss the functions of command: organization, motivation,
decision and execution
* Distinguish C3 from C2
* Discuss role of C' countermeasures as they apply to combat
* Discuss the concept of Information Warfare
* Define C2W, SEW, C41, and the C4 I for the Warrior Concept
READINGS:
1. Hughes, Wayne, Jr., "Command and Control Within the Framework
of a Theory of Combat," pp. 1-16, presentation to the AIAA C3
Symposium, June 1992.
2. Snyder, Frank, Command and Control: Readings and Commentary,
"Session 1 - Command and War," pp. 11 - 23, 1989.
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A. OBJECTIVES FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL AND THEORY OF
COMBAT
The purpose of this course is to give the student a background in combat
modeling and analysis. The many and varied tools of modeling are not
emphasized in this course as much as the principles and application of combat
models to the study of military operations. A combat model is valueless until it is
applied in some kind of combat analysis. The purpose of combat analysis is to
help a decision maker make better-informed decisions concerning his force
employment and tactics.
In order to understand how combat models are "built" and used, it is
necessary to understand some theory of combat and the unique terms associated
with combat. The theory presented in this course outline was developed by The
Military Conflict Institute (TMCI) for its general membership and is condensed in
this paper.
Forces are elements that perform actions directed against a given enemy
element or target. A commander may activate his forces, causing a collection of
actions to begin which, in themselves, cause processes that result in some
measurable result. The combination of these actions creates an effect on the
enemy which is called combat power.
The capacity for forces to successfully engage in combat is called combat
potential. The combat potential of forces can be measured in terms of their
designed and available potential. The designed combat potential of forces is the
capacity of those forces to engage in combat, measured under ideal conditions of
training, equipment, organization and motivation. The available combat potential
is the potential value of forces in the current state with respect to training,
9
equipment, organization, motivation, geographic and weather environment, and
specific enemy.
Combat Rower is the lethal means by which the states of enemy forces are
changed. The final results of the collection of processes are a synthesized






Forces Combat Potential Combat Power
Figure 1
The fundamental equation of combat power expresses how the forces and the
actions assigned to each element by a commander are combined to create combat
power. The general form of the equation is: P = F {m, u}, where "P" represents a
rate of combat energy delivery that will affect the enemy as combat power, "im"
represents the number of forces of a specific type, "u" is the rate of their activity
and "F" is the command function that governs m and u.
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In order to understand how combat analysis is connected with operational
and tactical decision making, the definitions of Command and Control will be
structured in such a way to reflect the theory of combat presented. The definition
in JCS Pub I (see page 17) provides a basis for expanded definitions developed in
the next section.
In terms of the theory of combat, command is the function of generating
combat potential through a collection of the activities of organization, motivation,
decision, and execution. The commander is responsible for ensuring that this
function is properly carried out. Command-control is the process by which
decisions are reached and orders to activate forces are communicated, so that
measurable combat power is created. A command-control system is the collection
of personnel, equipment and procedures the commander uses in the process of
command-control.
In examining the collection of all processes which both sides employ to
generate measurable combat power; C2 countermeasures are processes that impede
the enemy's ability to effectively activate and control his forces, in this way
diminishing the enemy's overall combat power.
B. COMBAT THEORY
The theory of combat and definition of C' terms are contained in the first
reading for this chapter, "Command and Control Within the Framework of a
Theory of Combat." The premise of the theory is that combat is a complex
interaction of force-on-force activities. The concept is developed by first
examining the smallest part of the military organization and building upon this
11
structure to develop the material necessary to understand the basis of that
interaction. What follows is a discussion of some key parts of the paper.
1. Force Functions, Actions, and Activities
Combat functions are responsibilities or roles played by forces. They
are the means with which to fight against a notional enemy without any knowledge
of who the enemy is or where the battle will take place. The functions are defined
independent of the environment in which any battle may occur.
In combat, each element of a force will perform actions based on the
function assigned to the element (by command), the current state of the element
(capability of the element at a given time) and the attributes of the element. For
example, an AAW unit will perform actions against enemy aircraft, but it is not
expected to take effective action against enemy infantry or armor. The effect of
the actions taken by the element is to cause some change in the state of the enemy
as well as the unit itself. This change in state caused by an element-action-element
exchange is known as a combat activity. The result of these activities is some
change in the receiving element's state which can be measured. For example the
effect of an AAW unit fiing at an approaching aircraft is a depletion of
ammunition for the firing unit and a possible loss of aircraft for the enemy.
Actions such as the delivery of fire can be quantified and measured, but combat
results come from activities that include the object element.
Note that to this point we have talked only about the effects of one side
upon the other. The second side is also usually delivering fire in return, so that
there is a total force-on-force effect.
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2. Combat As A Collection of Processes
The collective activities of the forces on both sides are combined into a
combat process which can be measured as results. The collective lethal actions of
the elements of a force and the countermeasures employed by the enemy have
observable net effects (such as attrition, suppression, retreat or other movement)
on the enemy elements. The results of activities (element-action-element) are the
new states of the delivering and receiving elements.
. The most common form of studying the command-control decision
process is through use of the Lawson-Moose C2 Cycle (Figure 2). In this cycle,
the commander observes the environment around him. The environment contains
friendly and enemy forces, terrain and weather. The only way the commander can
affect his environment is through the actions of his own forces or through
command-control countermeasures, which may cause the enemy to react directly
as a result of those countermeasures. The C2 process steps are: sensing the
environment, processing the sensed information, comparing present state to the
desired state, using decision aids in deciding upon the course of action to take, and
then acting upon that decision. Through the C2 process the commander is able to





Lawson-Moose Model of the C22 Process
Figure 2
3. Combat Potential
The capacity of a given force to fight is called its combat potential.
There are two types of combat potential which describe the state of a force. Its
designed combat potential is the capacity of a given force to be effective in
combating the known enemy, given optimal training, equipment, motivation,
organization and leadership. Designed potential assumes that the forces perform
as designed and intended, with complete understanding of who the enemy is and
the geographic location of the battlefield. With perfect information the force
would be optimally fitted to the specific battle. The available combat potential of
a force is the current capacity of a force to combat the actual enemy, given existing
levels of training, equipment, motivation, organization and leadership. Obviously,
the capacity for a force to conduct warfare at any given time against a specific
enemy will be less than its designed capacity due to imperfect levels of training,
equipment, organization, and an imperfect knowledge of the battlefield location
14
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and character of the enemy. The available combat potential will thus be measured





Designed Combat Available Combat
Potential Potential
Designed versus Available Combat Potential
Figure 3
4. Measurement Of Combat Power
The lethal effectiveness delivered by forces is a result of those forces
being activated by command against an enemy. This is the quantity called combat
power and is a result of forces engaging enemy forces at a given time and location.
Combat power is generated by forces carrying out combat actions against the
enemy, based upon a commander's activation of his forces utilizing a command-
control process. Combat power is generated from the available combat potential
of the forces similarly to the way that energy is consumed from a battery during its
15
use. Combat power is measured by the amount and kind of change in enemy
states. The change takes place on both sides simultaneously.
5. Fundamental Equation Of Combat Power
Having an understanding of combat, the next step is to develop an
equation for determining the relationship between the entity we desire to measure
-- combat power -- and the independent variables involved. The fundamental
equation of combat power for tacticians and theorists is of the form: P = F {m, u}.
The quantity, combat power (P), derives from the mission-specific
relationship between force elements (in) and the kind and time rate of their
activities (u). The function (F) governs the pattern of the elements' activities, so it
is called the command function. In other words, when the commander activates
his elements of combat potential, the "pattern" is the tasks they perform. Pattern is
meant to be what each element is doing (firing, scouting, maneuvering,
communicating, etc.), where it's doing it (flank, front, rear, enemy's rear,
entrenched, etc.) and how well it's doing it (rate of fire, rate of search, speed of
movement, effectiveness of communications, etc.). Since activities and combat
power usually have a geographical direction or orientation, they may be shown as
vectors.
In an operational sense, it is the pattern as well as the number of forces
and rate of activity that determines the combat power of one side. In the analytical
sense, a model that best describes the pattern of activity is chosen and is used to
compute the quantity of combat power delivered.
The effect of side A's combat power on side B, however, depends in part
on defensive actions by B's elements (entrenching, jamming, evasion, withdrawal,
etc.). This is why we must distinguish combat functions ordered and performed by
16
side A (which create raw combat power) from the two-sided process that
determines the effective combat power (or "force" as it is often called in the
literature). Effective power by side A causes observable results, such as casualties
to B, or his suppression, retreat or surrender.
B's countermeasures to lessen the effects of A's combat power are not
the same as B's offensive activities that generate his own combat power against A.
Combat is a force-on-force activity because A and B are both creating combat
power and attenuating the effect of their opponents' combat power.
It is the role of a commander to (a) govern the pattern of his forces'
activities and (b) do so with regard for the probable pattern of enemy activity. It is
the role of a combat analyst to discern probable patterns of both sides and model
them in a way that will result in better command decisions.
C. COMMAND AND CONTROL
1. Definition Of Terms
As a starting point, take the JCS Pub I definition of command and
control:
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander
over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and
control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel,
equipment, communications, facilities and procedures which are employed by
a commander in planning, directing, coordinating and controlling forces and
operations in the accomplishment of the mission.
Refer to your second reading assignment, Frank Snyder's Command and
Control Readings and Commentary, Session 1: Command and War, pp. 11-23. In
it, Snyder points out that the JCS definition contains three different notions. The
first is the concept of a function, or responsibility. The second idea is that of a
17
command-control process that performs the function. The third idea contained in
the definition is the physical entities that make up a command-control system.
2. The Function Of Command
Command, as taken from the JCS definition, is the all encompassing
responsibility associated with "the exercise of authority and direction by a
properly designated commander." To command a force, from the inception of that
force, to the execution of operation orders, requires functions including:
organization, motivation, decision and execution. Other responsibilities of
command such as training and education may be considered as a subset of the four
categories.
In light of the theory of combat, command is the all encompassing
function which generates the designed and available combat potential. Through
the sub-functions of organizing, motivating, deciding and executing, a commander
brings his forces from some untrained or otherwise unready condition to a point
where the available combat potential of the forces is as near as possible to its
designed combat potential. The readiness of the forces prior to executing an
operation is the responsibility of commanders at many echelons and is
accomplished through the function of command. Yet, at all times, the commander
must be ready for and expectant of change, be it in his own force's or in the enemy
lines. Take for example the following battlefield scenario (Figure 4).
The commander is in charge of four elements, three assault companies
on the front line and a reserve battalion held in the rear. There are two ways that
he may decide to utilize his forces. He may decide to reinforce the weaker
company, thereby endeavoring to present a balanced front to the enemy. Or he
18
may direct his reserve towards the company making a breach in the enemy lines,
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3. The C2 Process
We can also see that the JCS definition includes a "process employed by
a commander in planning, directing, coordinating and controlling forces in the
accomplishment of the mission." These are the actions taken by the commander to
transform the combat potential of forces into the realized combat power resulting
from carrying out mission orders.
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It is important for the theory of combat to distinguish command-control
as a process of transformation, not just a function, or responsibility, to govern
everything under a command. The command-control process occurs only when
the elements are part of the command-control system and the measured actions
carried out by the elements are part of the command-control process. Command-
control cannot be thought of as everything involved in combat. The activity of
ordering a battery to fire weapons is the command-control process. When the
artillery fires, and results are achieved on the enemy, that is called combat.
Command governs all the actions of its forces, but command-control is not
everything in combat. Combat is the all encompassing term.
4. Information Collection
Some definitions of command-control include information gathering.
We do not. The process of information gathering, including detection,
classification, tracking, targeting, etc., should be given status distinct from C2.
Indeed, how the decision is made to distribute forces to collect this information is
a vital decision which a commander must make. How the information is
interpreted once collected, and deciding what actions will be taken, based upon the
information, is indeed a command-control process; but the action of collecting the
information is best thought of, not as part of command-control, but as a separate
process in its own right: information collection. This point is extremely important
in current command-control problems as we will see later.
5. A Command-Control System
Having presented definitions for the command function and the
command-control process, the third step is to define a command-control system.
The JCS Pub. I definition includes a definition of a C2 system: "..the arrangement
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of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities and procedures which are
employed by the commander..". A command-control system contains all the
tangible items used to perform the command-control process. The command-
control system then is composed of:
Physical elements -- transmitters used to broadcast orders, signal lights and
flags, computers, code books and tapes, deciphering equipment, etc.;
"* Human elements -- the commander himself, communications staff, military
analysts in the chain of command, etc.;
"* Procedural elements -- used to conduct the process -- training manuals,
equipment manuals, procedural manuals for a fleet, organization charts and
command relationships.
A command-control system is used to facilitate the process of
command-control (Figure 5). It is important to note the inclusion of the
commander in the system definition. Without a commander to make the decisions,
the system cannot perform its function, so we must include the commander as part
of the very system he uses.
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6. Role Of Command-Control Countermeasures
If we define command-control as the process of transforming combat
potential into combat power, then command-control countermeasures are those
activities which reduce the effectiveness of the enemy's command-control. These
countermeasures cause the enemy's command-control elements to be less effective,
such as jamming radios, providing misleading intelligence and destroying his
command centers.
D. MODELING AND ANALYSIS
It was during World War 11 that military operations research gained its place
as an emerging science. After the war, the writings of Philip Morse, George
Kimball, P. M. S. Blackett and others who had analyzed military situations and
phenomena spurred the creation of modem military operations research. They
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encouraged analysis that used scientific principles applied to the environment of
combat because they had themselves seen how effective OA (Operations Analysis)
could be in developing better tactics and operations.
Prior to World War II there was no school of thought or formal organization
devoted to analysis of military actions or conditions, but during World War II
scientists "went to war." Some became involved very early in field operations,
most notably with radar in the Battle of Britain. From there it was natural that
they should involve themselves with the tactical employment of sensors and
weapons. Thus operations research was born. The works of Morse and Kimball,
presented in The Methods of Operation Research, 1946, still stand as a
cornerstone in the field.
A model, applied to any situation, is merely a "simplified representation of
the entity it imitates or simulates." The goodness of a model lies in how well it
achieves its purpose. The two major purposes of models are better decisions and
better training. But despite some current efforts to use computer power (e.g.,
virtual reality, SIMNET), models cannot reproduce war, and attempts to do so
have led to overwhelming complexity with little to show for it. Complexity per se
has little to do with utility, in practice.
A feature of good modeling is that the model is prepared with a specific need
in mind to serve the client for whom the model is built. In the case of military
modeling, the client may be, for example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff which desires to
have a model created to explore the effects of theater ballistic missile defense. We
say the model is "decision oriented."
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In developing models, there are general steps which must be taken by the
client as well as the analyst. In Work and Method of Operations Analysis, Robert






Perception. For the purposes of this course, the client will be taken to mean a
person in a position of command who must make decisions. Perception of the
problem as put forth by a client and as understood by the modeler, lays the basis
for providing a useful model as a tool for analysis. The modeler needs to
understand the context for which the model is being developed. Most analyses are
not intended to give a single solution as end products. Typically, the result is an
IF-THEN statement: if such-and-such are the inputs, then so-and-so will be the
results.
Formulation. Formulation of the client's problem is accomplished by means
of four actions. First, determine the objectives of the operation. Second, list the
alternative courses of actions. Sometimes the list must include both one's own and
the enemy's choices. Third, define a measure of effectiveness by which to
compare the alternatives. Fourth, determine the variables that are regarded as
critical and figure out how they interact so that the relationships can be modeled
during the step called analysis. An agreement on the problem statement, the data
available for the model and the assumptions which will be made, are necessary in
this step, prior to collecting the data and modeling the client's needs.
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Observation. The next step requires collecting data to be used in the model
and the environment which the model is attempting to emulate. This may often
cause a reformulation of the problem, if obvious changes are required to accurately
describe the environment.
Analysis. During the analysis step, the analyst combines his working model
with the observable data in such a way that "models" the situation. The user ought
to participate as this is being done in order to ensure that the model truly describes
the situation.
Presentation. The best analysis in the world does no good if it is not
presented clearly and persuasively. Presentation deserves much thought and
attention if the client is going to be persuaded to act on it.
Sometimes this process is cyclical or even done in another order. No matter
what the sequence, success depends on how well each step is carried out and how
closely the client is involved throughout. Military models assist in decision
making. As pointed out earlier, most models do not provide a definitive answer
but compare alternative choices according to an MOE. Four major modeling
techniques to fit a particular situation are available (Figure 6):
• Analytical representations,
* Computer simulations,
* Arrangement of war gaming tools and personnel,
• Field experiments.
The pros and cons of each technique and may be found in Military Modeling,
pages 1 - 36 found in the Readings for Chapter II.
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Some examples of model types listed for military applications include:
models by application or purpose (battle planning, wartime operations, weapon
procurement, force sizing, etc.), models by scope or scale (micro or single unit
engagement models, multi-engagement models), ad hoc and standing models, and
models that describe, prescribe or predict.
The use of all the above techniques, when applied to military operations
analysis, has added a scientific grounding for making command and control
decisions. This course will aid in the understanding of how modeling and analysis
aid in making better command and control decisions, toward increasing our
combat power and diminishing that of the enemy.
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E. COMBAT MODELING AS A TOOL FOR COMMAND-CONTROL
Having defined the terminology associated with combat, command-control,
and modeling, the next step is to discuss how they interact with each other.
As stated above, command generates maximum combat potential and
command-control transforms combat potential into combat power. Making
decisions that will increase either the combat potential or combat power of a force
involves some sort of analysis. The analysis techniques and tools used vary from
situation to situation.
As an example, consider the following case. A fleet commander embarked
on a flagship must decide how to assign ships in the fleet to various tasks (i.e.,
functions) while steaming to battle. During the oceanic transit, surveillance is of
utmost concern to the admiral. The admiral is faced with deciding how he will
allocate aircraft between being combat ready and providing surveillance and
scouting.
In this example, the system to be modeled is the battle group containing the
aircraft carriers, battleships and support ships. Inputs to the system include:
available aircraft of different types, fuel availability, pilots available and non-
organic surveillance data including remote sensors, satellites, etc., as resources. In
addition to the resources available, other inputs are present, including rules of
engagement (ROE) and directions from higher authority requiring the admiral to
remain undetected during the transit. The output from the combat model analysis
should help determine the surveillance and strike aircraft based upon the
surveillance information gathered.
The admiral must decide what his choices are, what tradeoffs exist, and what
the values should be for the measure of effectiveness for this situation. Using a
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certain aircraft for surveillance means that the aircraft is not available for a strike if
it should be required. For his MOE, the admiral chooses to base his decisions on
his ability to provide "sufficient" surveillance while retaining "sufficient" strike
power.
The role of combat analysis is now to simulate the battle group with a highly
specialized model, which the admiral can use to change the number of aircraft
used for surveillance, as well as their search plan (radial and circumferential
coverage), and see the resulting probability of detecting air, surface and subsurface
attackers. At the same time, he has a strike plan, derived from analysis, which
tells him how many aircraft will be necessary to attack a variety of targets. The
combat modeler must be familiar with the interrelationships between all the input
variables in order to provide an accurate model for the admiral. The admiral still
retains full responsibility for a final judgment and decision.
The ability to determine these interrelationships requires experience not
normally found in business or other type modeling. Due to the very nature of
combat, specialists in the field of combat analysis must be used who are familiar
with the various relationships that exist and the "laws" governing these
relationships. This is the art of combat analysis and the trait that those in a
position of command seek out to help them make decisions unique to the military
environment.
The goal of this course is to provide the student with a background in the
understanding of these combat modeling tools and techniques and an ability to
work with the analysts who provide useful information to the commander. In
order to do that, we have examined the functions of command and the processes of
command-control and command-control countermeasures; how they affect combat
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power and combat potential, how they are modeled and their usefulness.
However, the terms and definitions which have been presented thus far are by no
means the only ones associated with C3 today. In recent documents, the concept
of Information Warfare has been developed in order give credit to the enormous
potential and power of communications, intelligence and computer systems in
modem warfare. The problem with the documents is that Information Warfare,
and related terms such as SEW, C2W, C4I and the C4 I for the Warrior Concept,
has different connotations depending upon its use and whoever is using it. The
term has been applied to various concepts, organizations, programs, structures or
doctrine. We make no effort here to correlate the terms with our definitions of
command and command-control, given the different connotations and malleability
of the terms depending upon the issuing agency. We will, however, provide the
student with a sense of how many military commands express their use of
intelligence, computers and communications equipment in combat, in the
following section on Information Warfare. This is only a short introduction.
Additional discussions will follow throughout the C3 curriculum.
F. INFORMATION WARFARE
If one accepts the argument that man has moved from the "Industrial Age"
into the "Information At,-" then one must acknowledge the importance of
Information Warfare (IW) on the battlefield. Just as air superiority/supremacy
became more and more critical to successful military operations during the
"Industrial Age," information superiority/supremacy arguably has become just as,
if not more, broad and important in the "Information Age" (AFSC, 1993, pg. 1.6).
While air warfare meant the destruction of enemy air, ground and naval forces and
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the protection of friendly ones using airborne assets, Information Warfare takes on
more meaning. Not only does it involve the physical destruction of enemy air,
ground, and naval forces and protection of friendly ones using information assets,
it is also a tool used for attacking, confusing and misleading enemy C2 centers and
C3 systems, while protecting friendly C3 assets and assisting C2 decision makers.
Information Warfare gains on the battlefield, such as confusion of enemy
commanders, misdirection of forces, or destruction of C3 nodes, may be more
difficult to see than physical bomb damage or territory taken from the enemy,
nonetheless, these gains are just as important. Enemy confusion at both the
command and tactical levels is a powerful weapon and one that can be obtained by
using information as a tool of war.
1. Command and Control Warfare
The concept of Information Warfare is implemented on the battlefield
through the use of the military strategy of Command and Control Warfare (C2W).
C2W as defined by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in "Memorandum of
Policy, Number 30," 1993, is:
the integrated use of operations security (OPSEC), military deception,
psychological operations (PSYOP), electronic warfare (EW) and physical
destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to,
influence, degrade or destroy adversary C2 capabilities, while protecting
friendly C2 capabilities against such actions" (CJCS, 1993, pg. 2).
C2W has two divisions: C2-Protection and Counter-C2 . C2-Protection is a
defensive action involving maintaining effectiveness of friendly C2 by either
enhancement of it or negation or destruction of enemy efforts against it. Counter-
C2 is an offensive action involving the prevention of enemy C2 by denying
information to, influencing, degrading or destroying the enemy's C2 systems. Both
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divisions employ all of the five principal military actions of C2W, as seen in
Figure 7 (CJCS, 1993, pg. 2).
COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE
Counter-C 2  C2-Protection
OPSEC OPSEC
Military Deception Military Deception
PSYOP PSYOP
EW EW
Physical Destruction Physical Destruction
Figure 7
Operations security is the process of denying the enemy information
about friendly capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling and protecting
the indicators associated with planning and conducting military operations (AFSC,
1993, pg. 9.2). Indicators may be physical, technical or administrative in nature.
The key to OPSEC is that it not a stand-alone process. In order to be most
effective it must be coupled with military deception.
Military deception is used to mislead enemy commanders so that they
act or fail to act in a manner prejudicial to their own interests and advantageous to
friendly forces. The deception must be believable, verifiable, consistent and
simple in order to work. Ideally, it should reinforce the enemy's own prejudices
and perceptions. On the other hand, we must be aware that the enemy is capable
of deception too, and thus be alert to his efforts at, or possibilities of, deception.
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When deception and OPSEC are combined together effectively, the enemy
commander not only does not know of the true friendly-force plan, he also
wrongly believes in the plan devised by friendly forces for his deception.
Psychological operations differ from deception in that they constitute a
planned, systematic process of conveying messages to, and influencing, a selected
group in order to establish and reinforce enemy perceptions of friendly military
superiority. (AFSC, 1993, pg. 12.2). PSYOP can be used cohesively, to join a
group to unite or look favorably on the friendly forces, or devisively, to separate a
group from a particular leader or faction, or in combination with one another.
Electronic warfare can be viewed as the use of electromagnetic energy
to attack an enemy's combat capability, to protect friendly combat capabilities
against enemy electromagnetic attack, or surveillance of the electromagnetic
spectrum for threat recognition. With the relatively recent proliferation of
electronic means of communication and detection, EW can be a powerful tool for
the commander.
Physical destruction can be thought of as either the complete destruction
of a C2 capability or system or as rendering it incapable for a given period of time.
Destruction does not necessarily have to be physical in nature; if the enemy's C2
abilities are removed yet the physical structures remain, the goal has been
achieved.
Each of these actions, when taken separately, can have a measurable
effect on the enemy. However, combat power is maximized when all five actions
are coordinated as one. It is this integrated employment that is the essence and
aim of C2W strategy: an effective, efficient, coordinated application of different
32
capabilities, processes, techniques and weapons across the spectrum of an
adversary's C2 (CJCS, 1993, pg. 5).
2. Space and Electronic Warfare
In 1989, the Chief of Naval Operations formally designated Space and
Electronic Warfare (SEW) as a composite warfare area and the Navy's strategic
precursor to C2W. The strategic objective of SEW is similar to that of C2W: to
separate the enemy commander from his forces, to render the leader remote from
his people (to take command of his forces in effect), and control his use of the
electromagnetic spectra. The target set consists of those systems, which when
destroyed, yield this objective (CNO, 1992, pg. 1).
SEW includes both warfare and warfare support functions. As a
warfare function, SEW is the destruction or neutralization of enemy SEW targets.
As warfare support function, it is the enhancement of friendly force battle
management through the integrated employment and exploitation of the
electromagnetic spectra and the medium of space (CNO, 1992, pg. 2). These
correspond to the C2W divisions of Counter-C2 and C2-Protection. However
Space is the key to differentiating SEW and C2W. Because naval forces
traditionally operate long distances from their bases of command and support,
SEW is specifically designed for the use of satellite assets as warfare aids.
The warfare and warfare support functions of SEW include several
disciplines designed to accomplish the functions (CNO, 1992, pp. 4-5). Figure 8
lists them.
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SPACE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE
Warfare Warfare Support
Operational Deception Operational Security
Counter-Surveillance Surveillance
Counter-C 41 C41
Electronic Combat Signals Management
Figure 8
At first glance, SEW and C2W may appear to be mirror images of one
another. However there are a few dissimilarities. For instance, while OPSEC and
deception appear in both warfare systems, they are not linked to one another as
closely as in C2W. C41 is a new term which will be defined later. Finally, PSYOP
and physical destruction are not included in SEW. This does not mean that they
are not involved in SEW at any level. PSYOP is difficult to achieve for ships at
sea operating against one another. And while destruction is not specifically
mentioned at this level, it is specifically included as a means towards achieving the
goal of warfare.
3. Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence
Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C41)
is the means to the end of' Command and Control. It is self-described as the
technological, organizational and doctrinal system that provides three functions:
the delegation of forces (i.e., command and control), information management
(i.e., communications and computers) and intelligence dissemination (CNO, 1992,
pg. 5). For C41 to accomplish those functions, it is to afford timely decision
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making, provide horizontal and vertical C2 interoperability, be available on
demand, utilize global C41 assets and be adaptive to unforeseen situations. Ideally,
C4I should be invisible to the commander, always available, working trouble free.
C'I can be thought of as the technical, technological means of assisting the
commander in effective C2 on the battlefield.
CI for the Warrior, promulgated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in "ClI for
the Warrior, Objective Concept," began after Desert Storm. It expresses itself as a
concept for a uniform-action infrastructure which will eventually tie together
global CI assets in order to give the commander access to all required/requested
information and will provide the information when, where and how he wants it.
CI for the Warrior Concept differs from the C'I warfare in that the latter is a
"narrow" method of achieving gains on the battlefield and, as such, its entire scope
is purely combat/conflict oriented. C'I for the Warrior Concept, on the other
hand, envelopes more than a battlefield, or a specific conflict. It is a global
architecture for data, communications and intelligence updating, encompassing
situations and operations both in peacetime and in war. However, that wartime
connectivity, rehearsed by means of peacetime operations will make it an effective
tool for SEW, C2W and Information Warfare. It will provide the
communications/intelligence link that assists SEW and C2W commanders in
fighting the Information War.
G. RELEVANCE TO FURTHER CURRICULUM COURSES
This chapter, more than any other, lays out the basic structure for the
understanding of command and control as an entity. The basic terms, such as
command, command-control, combat modeling and analysis, combat functions and
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potential, etc., are essential for an understanding of the Command, Control and
Communications concept as a whole. The terms defined within this chapter are
used and referred to throughout the C3 curriculum courses.
In CC 3000, Introducuon to Command, Control and Communications, C3
was presented in a historical framework. Examples from current military
structures were provided in order to acquaint the student with how command and
control functions in the real world and how it has played a role in past military
campaigns and operations. In the current course, C3 is examined in a more
fundamental framework. Here, the student strives to separate the historical
accounts of the commander's abilities and experience from the commander's
knowledge of C' as a concept. The purpose is to try to give the student a
knowledge of the basic structure of combat and modeling techniques so that he/she
will be able to evaluate and sometimes use similar models for him/herself.
In OS 3008, Analytical Planning Methodology, the terms of C3 thus far
presented, -such as: forces, combat potential, combat power, etc., are used with
actual military modeling applications. Through the use of mathematical and
statistical design models, the student is shown how careful study of forces, combat
potential, systems and processes aids in determining the proper mix of men and
materials to accomplish military tasks. In OS 3603, Simulation and Wargaming,
the student is shown how C3 relates to actual wargaming and simulation scenarios,
with the emphasis on using proven military models and creating ones that are
mission specific.
The remaining CC courses: CC 4001, C3 System Engineering, CC 4003, C3
Systems Evaluation, CC 4750, Military C3 Systems Issues and CC 4913, Policies
and Problems in C3, all use the concepts in Chapter II. However these courses
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deal much more with concepts presented in later chapters and will be further
expanded upon in those chapters.
H. REVIEW QUESTIONS
1. Distinguish between a function and a process as it relates to combat.
2. Define the terms command, command-control, and command and
control system.
3. Identify the elements of a command-control system. What is an
element's "state"? Explain why a surveillance system should not be
considered as a component of the command and control system.
4. Describe the significance of the three components of the "element-
action-element" model of combat. How are the two elements related?
Is this a model of a process or a function?
5. Is it possible to measure combat force directly? Identify two alternate
methods of measuring combat force.
6. Explain the difference between designed combat potential and available
combat potential. Give several factors which may account for
differences between the two potentials.
7. The fundamental equation of combat power defines combat power as a
function of tasks (actions) to be performed and units (elements) to
perform those tasks. How does command-control enter into this
function and what are the effects of command-control on achieved
combat power?
8. You have been told that command-control countermeasures is a process.
Illustrate with three examples.
9. Describe the concept of Information Warfare and its relation to SEW,
C4l, and the C4I for the Warrior concept.
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Provide the student with an understanding of the various types of models and
their characteristics. Emphasize that a model is a tool for analysis. Discuss the
role of the modeler in useful analysis, and analysis in aiding the decision maker.
OBJECTIVES:
* Definition of a model
• Purpose of modeling is to support decision making to improve performance
and make better decisionS
* Discuss the general uses of models -- as a decision aid, research tool, and a
training device
• Understand characteristics of a good model
• Discuss types of models
* Discuss the modeling process
* Discuss the factors affecting model validity -- faulty data, faulty model and
faulty reasoning or logic
* Emphasize the limitations of models
* Distinguish between approximation and abstraction
* All models are IF-THEN statements
0 Discuss methods and consequences of data collection
* Understand the effect of the wartime setting on data collection
* Definition of "dirty data"
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Discuss the principles of proper model design
• Emulate the physical phenomenon
* Keep the model simple, yet adequate (apply reasonableness test)
* Keep decision to be made in view -- ensure model assists the
Jec.sion
READINGS:
1. Hughes, Wayne, Jr. Military Modeling, pp. 1-43, 1989.
2. Levis, Alexander, Modeling and Measuring Effectiveness of C'
Systems, pp. 15-18, 1986.
3. Giordano and Weir, A First Course in Mathematical Modeling, pp.
29-40, 1985.
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A. DEFINITIONS AND PURPOSE OF MODELING
"A model is a simplified representation of the entity it imitates or simulates"
(Hughes, 1989, pg. 1). The goal of modeling is to strip away the superfluous
detail and complexity of reality and lay bare the underlying variables, constants
and relationships in order to draw conclusions, make predictions or support
decision making. Specifically, the aim of military modeling is the study of combat
forces to support decision making relevant to force structure and force
employment. The purpose of military modeling, and modeling in general, is to
provide a more solid basis for decision making with the goal of improving
performance and the quality and timeliness of decisions made. "A model is useful
if a better decision can be made with the information that it adds" (Hughes, 1989,
pg. 17).
B. USE OF MODELS
Three fundamental uses of military models are as decision aids, research
tools, and training devices. The principal application of these tools deals with the
following force structure concerns (Hughes, 1989, pp. 23-33):
* Battle Planning -- to improve tactics, operations or force composition.
"* Wartime Operations -- to solve time-sensitive questions.
"* Weapon Procurement -- to apply principles of systems analysis to yield
cost-effective selection of competing weapon systems.
"* Force Sizing -- to help determine force mix, identity or establish trends, or
project future requirements.
* Human Resources Planning -- to support management decision making
primarily in the area of manpower personnel and training.
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Logistics Planning -- to project logistics requirements and optimize logistics
support.
National Policy Analysis -- to assess the impact of broader policy decisions
on military concerns.
Since models are used to support decision making, their utility is most
beneficial when they accomplish one or more of the following (Hughes, 1989, pg.
14):
"• explore issues in an orderly way,
"• structure and discipline the debate,
"* compare and contrast alternatives,
"* reveal new characteristics,
"* lead to unexpected but valid conclusions.
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF GOOD MODELS
The principal measure of a model's usefulness is its ability to communicate
the attributes of the phenomenon under study. The ability to communicate is
constrained by several characteristics, the foremost of which are transparency,
flexibility, and reproducibility (Hughes, 1989, pg. 24). Transparency refers to the
ease with which the intended user can understand the model and its results.
Simplicity and transparency both facilitate model modification. Flexibility refers
to the ease with which a model can be adapted to varying situations, as well as
wide ranges of input data. Reproducibility refers to the ability of a model to
generate the same results using the same data each time the model is applied.
Additionally, the results must be independent of the individual that applies the
model. Military Modeling lists a total of 14 characteristics of military models
based on findings of the Army Models Review Committee (AMRC) (Hughes,
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1989, pg. 7). However these three, flexibility, transparency and reproducibility,
together with relevancy (roughly, how much insight is enough) provide a
framework for measuring a model's utility and validity.
Though credibility is a characteristic unto itself, according to the AMRC,
Alexander Levis sets it in the forefront of model evaluation issues (Levis, 1986,
pg. 15). Levis holds that the credibility of a model is a function of its coherence,
corresponding clarity and workability. These functions address the extent to
which the model's outputs agree with the anticipated outcomes, and the ease with
which the model communicates the problem analysis. The ultimate test of a
model's credibility is the willingness of the decision maker to apply the results of
the model.
D. THE ANALYSIS AND MODELING PROCESS
The fundamental methodology of model development closely follows the
classical approach to scientific problem solving. One approach to this
methodology is described by Clayton Thomas {in (Hughes, 1989, pg. 56)} where
he discusses the findings of Robert Dorfman, who recall, divides the analysis
process into five stages:
* Perception -- recognition that a problem exists and the generation of a
problem statement in the form of a measure of effectiveness.
"* Formulation -- determination of what is to be measured and the generation of
a hypothesis, frequently expressed as a model.
"• Observation -- collection of data upon which to validate the model or
generate conclusions.
"• Analysis -- test the hypothesis against the observed data.
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Presentation -- recommendation of a course of action or decision based upon
analysis of data and hypothesis.
A similar approach to modeling is given by Frank Giordano and Maurice
Weir (Giordano and Weir, 1985, pp. 29-40) where the generation of an acceptable
model is the result of an iterative application of the following steps:
* Identify the problem,
* Make assumptions -- determine variables, constants and relationships,
* Interpret the model -- state in concise terms,
* Verify the model -- check reasonableness and validity of results,
* Implement the model,
* Maintain the model.
The heart of modeling lies with the correct identification of the problem or
situation to be studied and the correct identification of the more significant
variables and the relationships between them. "The great art of modeling is to
identify the primary relationships pertinent to the issue, isolate them, and study
their effects" (Hughes, 1989, pg. 13).
E. FACTORS AFFECTING MODEL VALIDITY
Three principal factors which may cause a model to be invalid are faulty
reasoning or logic, a faulty model, or faulty data.
Faulty reasoning or logic results from incorrectly identifying the problem to
be studied or omitting significant variables pertinent to the problem. The
modeler's judgment and expertise are critical to successful model generation
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(Hughes, 1989, pg. 33). Hughes holds that combat modeling must be
accomplished by professionals.
F. UNDERSTANDING THE LIMITATIONS OF MODELS
A faulty model results from the failure to identify the correct objective
(measurement standard) for a given problem statement. See Morse and Kimball's
analysis (pp. 52-53) of anti-aircraft guns on merchant ships as an example.
Secondly, because models are based on limiting assumptions, they become IF-
THEN statements (Hughes, 1989, p. 26). This means that if, and only if, the
model and its data are correct, then the model results are true. Third, when the
model is used outside the bounds of its limiting assumptions, the results must be
suspect.
A fourth factor in model validity arises from approximation and abstraction.
Military Modeling differentiates between these two notions and identifies their
impact on model validity (Hughes, 1989, pg. 40). At best, models only partly and
incorrectly represent reality. Their accuracy is a function of model fidelity.
Additionally, "error" due to mathematical calculations, according to Giordano and
Weir, can be attributed to round-off error (computer induced), and truncation error
(a finite representation of an infinite series of terms) (Giordano and Weir, 1985,
pg. 89). These "computational errors" are what Military Modeling more aptly calls
approximations (Hughes, 1989. pg. 42). Abstraction errors are the result of
limiting the complexity of the real situation so that it can be modeled. Thus,
factors which only affect the situation in a secondary way may be omitted from the
model in order to keep the model understandable and workable. Giordano and
Weir term this phenomenon as "formulative error."
"p4
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In many cases, the abstraction is deliberate because the analyst views the
additional "error" as acceptable. Linear programming is an example of a powerful
optimization technique that assumes that linear relationships always exist between
variables; this is always a chancy assumption when modeling the real world, but it
is good enough in many circumstances.
G. DATA COLLECTION
Faulty data may affect the model in several ways. First, if inaccurate data is
used to generate the model, then the assumption made regarding relationships
between variables, based upon the sample data, may be inaccurate. Secondly, if
inaccurate data is used to verify or validate a model, then the model may be
erroneously certified but, when it is used with more accurate data, it may generate
faulty results. Giordano and Weir term the limitation on model accuracy as
"measurement errors" (Giordano and Weir, 1985, pg. 89).
Wartime data collected to support combat analysis is especially susceptible to
measurement errors due to the very nature of combat. Use of cover, concealment
and deception result in inaccuracies in measuring enemy performance. The tempo
of battle results in poor measurement and recording of friendly losses.
Additionally, environmental factors may preclude measurements. Thus, wartime
data must be viewed with skepticism. Because of the nature of this dirty data,
Morse and Kimball argued for making changes in tactics only when at least a
three-fold net increase (a hemibel difference) in performance could be anticipated
(Morse and Kimball, 1946, pg. 38).
The importance of data in model accuracy is highlighted by Alfred
Lieberman in an analysis of national policy modeling {in (Hughes, 1989, pg. 215-
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233)). He holds that discrepancies between model results are typically due to
differences in input dRta or assumptions.
H. PROPER MODEL SELECTION
The final selection or generation of a model is governed by three simple
principles:
" Keep the decision maker and the decision to be made in mind. The keys are
timeliness and understandability.
" Keep the model as simple as possible, yet sufficient in detail to adequately
reflect the environment being analyzed. According to Weir, the model must
be reasonable, that is, "does it agree with common sense?"
" The model must emulate the physical phenomena being analyzed. Personal
perceptions or biases introduced by either the decision maker or the analyst
will hinder the model's validity.
1. RELEVANCE TO FURTHER CURRICULUM COURSES
In this chapter, modeling!s characteristics, uses and selection are explored.
Modeling is essential to the C' planner, in that it provides a basis for
understanding how equipment and procedures interact before they are actually
employed on the battlefield. Modeling helps describe the situation and gives
planners and commanders alike valuable tools to use in order to try to achieve
victory.
Several courses in the curriculum further explore modeling and modeling
techniques. Many of their concepts and modeling procedures are built upon the
premises presented in this chapter. OS 3008, Analytical Planning Methodology
and OS 3603, Simulation and Wargaming, both deal primarily with modeling,
while CC 4003, C' Systems Evaluation, applies statistical evaluation techniques to
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examine various military C3 models. In OS 3008, the basic structure of military
modeling is examined with special emphasis on model development application
and validation/verification. Resource allocation, constrained optimization and
game theory will receive close attention. OS 3008 uses commercial computer
software to explore various concepts and acquaint the student with actual
modeling and analysis techniques. In OS 3603, the emphasis is more towards the
technical applications of military models and modeling. Detailed model structure,
computer coding of simulation models, random number generation, data analysis,
sample size and replication of data, are presented. Additionally, students will
learn to design their own models and work on actual military models (simulations
and wargames) in use. Finally, in CC 4003, C3 Systems Evaluation, models
currently in use at the Naval Postgraduate School and ones in use throughout the
military are examined and evaluated using statistical methods. These three courses
extend and amplify the concepts introduced in this and later chapters.
J. REVIEW QUESTIONS
1. Define modeling and state its purpose.
2. Identify the fundamental uses of modeling.
3. Distinguish between the five different types of models as defined in
Military Modeling and give an example for each category.
4. Give several ways in which models can be used to support decision
making.
5. Given that the ability of a model to communicate provides a measure of
its usefulness, explain why the model's transparency, flexibility, and
reproducibility can affect its value. Explain why its fidelity can hinder
its value.
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6. Discuss the underlying importance of a model's credibility.
7. Compare and contrast the steps in an analysis as defined by Dorfinan
and Weir.
8. Identify the three factors which affect a model's validity, the stage(s) in
the model development in which each is likely to occur, and measures
which may be taken to mitigate their effects.
9. Distinguish between an abstraction and an approximation. give an
example of when they might be desirable.
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IV. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS, PERFORMANCE AND
FORCE EFFECTIVENESS (MOE/MOP/MOFE)
AIM:
Define MOP, MOE and MOFE. Ensure the student understands the
differences and similarities between variables and parameters in terms of
equipment characteristics (or capabilities), system performance and operational (or
organizational) effectiveness.
OBJECTIVES:
Define Measures Of Effectiveness (MOE), Measures Of Performance
(MOP) and Measures Of Force Effectiveness (MOFE)
Show how the uses of MOEs are a logical consequence of modeling
techniques to efforts geared towards improving the effectiveness of combat
operations
Show how the choice of MOE is dependent upon the phenomena being
modeled -- either as a one-sided, force-on-force or hunter-evader model
Examine analyses by Morse and Kimball during World War 1I showing




* Equipment performance evaluation
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READINGS:
1. Rockower, Edward, "Notes on Measures of Effectiveness," pp. 1-6,
1985.
2. Sweet, et. al., "Command and Control Evolution Workshop," pp.
2.1-2.8, 1985.
3. Morse, Philip and George Kimball, Methods of Operations
Research, Chapter 1, 3, 1946.
4. Thomas, Clayton "MOE's ... Origins, Evolution, Roles," pp. 1-13.
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A. DEFINITION OF MOE/MOP/MOFE
Performance and effectiveness measurements provide a quantitative means of
determining the extent to which mission requirements are being met, the degree to
which a system is affecting the environment in which it is operating, or the impact
an operational decision is having upon combat outcomes. In order to support
better decision making, Edward Rockower asserts that one must "establish a
consistent, quantitative, measurable and credible measure .. of the value of
alternative courses of action .." (Rockower, 1985, pg. 2). These measures may
assess the value of the system in terms of design specifications, functional
operation or mission enhancement. According to Dr. Ricki Sweet, (Sweet, et. al,
1985, pp. 2.6) these measures are:
* Measures of Performance (MOP) -- a function of the system's behavioral
attributes;
Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) -- a function of the system's performance
within the operational cnvironment.
Measure of Force Effectiveness (MOFE) -- a function of system
effectiveness within a force structure in war.
B. IMPROVING EFFECTIVENESS OF COMBAT OPERATIONS
Morse and Kimball asserted that, prior to World War II, tactics and strategy
were strongly influenced by environmental factors and little quantitative
measurement of decision variables was possible (Morse and Kimball, 1946, pg. 2).
They said that the principal purpose of Operations Research is to analyze tactics,
strategy and equipment and the operations in which these are applied. Prior to the
organization of the Operations Research Group (ORG) in April 1942, most
scientific contributions to warfare advancement were in terms of new "gadgets"
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vice better usage of current weapons (Morse and Kimball, 1946, pg. 1). The ORG
supported:
"* evaluation of new equipment, to include development of tactics to enhance
their employment;
"• evaluation of operations;
"* evaluation and analysis of tactical problems;
"* analysis of strategic planning;
"* providing research and development liaison.
According to Morse and Kimball, the principal goal of Operations Research
is to improve the efficiency (effectiveness) of current and future operations.
In "MOEs -- Origins, Evolution, Roles," Clayton Thomas identifies two
principal uses for measures of effectiveness: as an indicator, to enhance the
understanding of an operation or improve its performance; or as an optimizer, used
to determine or select the best alternative. Thomas summarizes Omand Solandt's
account of the use of MOEs in World War II as a three step process (Thomas,
"MOEs -- Origins, Evolutions, Roles," pp. 4-5):
"• Discover the purpose of the operations, i. e., describe it,
"* Determine some means of measuring its effectiveness,
"* Try to improve its effectiveness.
C. DEPENDENCE UPON PHENOMENA BEING MODELED
As one of their important contributions to analysis, Morse and Kimball
introduced the use of MOEs for comparing the observed operations with
theoretical outcomes, friend versus foe, exchange rates and operational results
between different systems.
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In striving to find the "constants of an operation" and determining how
changes to them affect operations, Morse and Kimball demonstrate their use of
MOEs in World War II analysis to be indicative in nature. Their goal was not to
optimize combat operations, nor to predict the outcomes of battles, but rather to
improve the use of tactics and equipment.
The selection of an MOE/MOP/MOFE is critical to performing a valid
analysis of a system or operation. The choice of an MOE is often determined by
examining the situation to be analyzed and the interaction of forces as either:
One-sided: measures changes to situation due to actions of only one side.
No response is considered by the opposing side. Most logistics (supply,
medicine, repair) and many operations are of this nature.
* Force-on-Force: Participants on both sides in a conflict take opposing
actions affecting the situation to be analyzed.
• Hunter-Evader: The aggressor takes action to discover or destroy his
opponent, while the non-aggressor takes action to avoid detection. Much of
Antisubmarine Warfare is of this nature.
A special case of the hunter-evader activity is the predator-prey situation,
where the hunter seeks the evader with the intent of capture or destruction. In this
case the prey (evader) has some means to fight back and inflict casualties on the
hunter. An example of this case is the U-boat wolfpacks versus the armed convoys
of World War II. Thus, these types of actions have some of the characteristics of
the force-on-force case.
D. WORLD WAR II EXAMPLES
1. Sweep Rates
One of the first analyses examined by Morse and Kimball involved
sweep rates. They suggested measuring the effectiveness of area searches by
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comparing the operational values observed (Figure 9) to the theoretical values
computed (Figure 10). The equations for these values are given by (Morse and
Kimball, 1946, pg. 39):
C = number of contacts
N = probable number of enemy in area
A = total area being searched (square miles)
TN= total search time (hours)
the average density of enemy in the area ( enemy
'A square mile)(-)= number of contacts produced per unit of search time (hours)
(T operational sweep rate
Qop • =(C)(A) measured in square miles per hour
(N)>
S...... . .....................  iiii i i~ i ) !
D =A Total N includes all U + C
Operational Sweep Rate Variables
Figure 9
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R = effective lateral range of detection in miles
V = relative speed of search craft in miles per hour
Qth = theoretical sweep rate
Q-- 2 R V measured in square miles per hour
Theoretical Sweep Rate Variables
Figure 10
Note that (N) is the ratio of contacts made to the expected number of
contacts in the area. If - 1, then some of the enemy were contacted more
than once. If -) 1, then some of the enemy were not contacted at all.
By taking the ratio 2--, a dimensionless factor results, giving the netQth
effectiveness of the search activity. QoP was generally less than Q,. Morse and
Kimball said this was to be expected, but when the operational rate was more a
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factor of three less than the theoretical rate, then this was cause for investigation.
(A factor of three was called a "hemibel" by Morse and Kimball. See page 46.)
Sweep rates may be used when measuring one-sided search activities or
hunter-evader activities where the evasion tactics of the non-aggressor serve to
limit the effectiveness of the aggressor's search. When the evader (prey) takes
action to fight back and destroy the aggressor, exchange rates should be considered
in addition to sweep rates.
2. Exchange Rates
A much-used MOE for all forms of warfare is the exchange rate, the
ratio between enemy loss and own loss (Morse and Kimball, 1946, pg. 45).
Assuming similar equipment on both sides, the exchange rate is simply:
1 number of enemy losses
k number of friendly losses
(1)= Exchange Rate
The ratio of units lost to units engaged are:
m - number of friendly units engaged
n = number of enemy units engaged
(!and(!
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The ratio -+ ) is called the Fractional Exchange Ratio (among
several names given it) and is one of the most useful measures of success in force-
on-force situations. It will be examined in detail later in the course.
Factors affecting exchange rates that are not explicitly part of the
equation include the training and experience levels of the participants and the
types of equipment included in the engagement.
When high value targets, such as military convoys, are being pursued by
aggressors, such as submarines, two important effectiveness measures are
encounter and engagement rates. When the high value targets are protected by
active friendly forces, sometimes an appropriate effectiveness measure is the
exchange ratio, ships sunk to submarines sunk. Morse and Kimball examined the
tactics of escorting convoys as an example of exchange rate measurements (Morse
and Kimball, 1946, pg. 46).
3. Comparative Performance
Another MOE advanced by Morse and Kimball was to compare the
relative effectiveness of different tactics or weapons. The difficult task here is to
determine an equitable but usable unit of measurement. The analyst must
determine what phenomena are critical and determine how these are affected by
the various tactics or weapon systems being analyzed. As examples of the method
of comparative effectiveness, Morse and Kimball analyzed the impact of anti-ship
weapons on ship design and bombing of U-boat pens versus escorting convoys
(whether the best use of aircraft in the protection of merchant shipping is as ASW
platforms, interdiction, or close air support) (Morse and Kimball, 1946, pp. 48-
49).
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4. Analyzing Equipment Performance
Finally, Morse and Kimball showed how the MOE methodology could
be applied to assess the performance of a weapon system. Four factors were
identified which are relevant to measuring the effectiveness of a weapon system at
any stage of its development (Morse and Kimball, 1946, pg. 52):
* Cost - "Is the new weapon system worth obtaining or using at all?"
* Employment - "When and where should the new system be used?"
• Maintainability - "Is the new equipment easy to maintain in operation?"
* Training - "How much and what type of training is needed in order for the
new weapon to be more effective than the old one?"
Morse and Kimball cited the use of anti-aircraft guns on merchant ships,
anti-torpedo nets, depth charge settings and supervised practice as examples of
MOEs being used to assess new equipment's performance.
E. RELEVANCE TO FURTHER CURRICULUM COURSES
Performance and effectiveness measurement is desirable in any type of
operation. However, in attempting to evaluate command, control and
communication systems, it is nothing less than essential. A commander, a
modeler, even a lone soldier, must have some way to discover the best alternative
from a number of choices. This chapter introduces the student to various methods
of determining the best MOE/MOP/MOFE. Additionally, equations for Sweep
and Exchange Rates are presented in order to acquaint the student with how to
numerically evaluate the optimum choice. This chapter provides an introduction
to various examples and methods for measuring performance and effectiveness, a
skill which will be much used in future courses.
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OS 3008, Analytical Planning Methodology, uses MOEs and MOPs to
introduce how operations researchers support planning decisions using various
optimization techniques. Additionally, the student will use MOE development
techniques to decide on appropriate measures for evaluating an assigned system.
OS 3603, Simulation and Wargaming, teaches the student to make determinations
of how to weigh choices given multiple MOEs with different measurement units
using sensitivity analysis. This course uses the statistics and probability theory
first introduced in OS 2103 and OS 3604 in order to provide hands-on MOE
calculation experience. Finally, CC 4001, C3 Systems Engineering, and CC 4003,
C3 Systems Evaluation, both use MOEs to explaining real world techniques and
how actual military systems are designed, tested and evaluated utilizing
appropriate measures.
F. REVIEW QUESTIONS
1. Distinguish between a measure of performance, a measure of
effectiveness and a measure of force effectiveness. As these
measurements are not mutually exclusive, give an example of a
measurement which is both a measure of effectiveness and a measure of
performance, depending on circumstances.
2. Distinguish between a force-on-force model and a hunter-evader model.
Give an example of each. What is the impact on the model when an
evader is able to retaliate and inflict injury upon the hunter?
3. Morse and Kimball, in World War II analysis, merely attempted to
improve tactics and operations rather than optimize combat operations.
Justify this approach.
4. Contrast the use of MOEs as indicators and optimizers.
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5. Compare the three step process of MOE development on page 54 with
the methods of model generation proposed by Giordano and Weir, In
Section F of Chapter III.
6. a. Given that a scout plane has an average speed of 200 mph and
can observe objects at a distance of 10 miles, what is its
theoretical sweep rate?
b. If the average density of enemy targets in the area of coverage
is 0.0125 targets per square mile and the historical records
indicate that the operational sweep rate is 65% of the theoretical,
how many contacts can be expected in a 3 hour search?
c. If the scout plane's effectiveness increases to 95% with a 25%
reduction in speed, is the change warranted in terms of
contacts made in a three hour period?
d. How many contacts would have to be made in a three hour period to
achieve an operational sweep rate of 1000%?
e. On what basis might the observed sweep rate actually exceed the
theoretical sweep rate?
7. One of the decisions studied by Morse and Kimball was whether to
install anti-aircraft guns on merchant ships. Identify two possible
reasons for these installations and the MOE associated with each reason.
Analyze the reasonableness of the installation in terms of the four
factors given for evaluating equipment performance.
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V. ATTRITION BASED MODELS
AIM:
Introduce the student to elementary force-on-force models. Introduce
attrition models which rely solely on casualty data to determine outcome of the
battle. Provide the students with attrition formulas as tools for eaAy combat
analysis, along with examples to ensure an understanding of the equations.
OBJECTIVES:
* Show that attrition models are based on simultaneous infliction of casualties
• Present the logic and conditions for Lanchester's Laws
* The linear law equation
* Discuss the concept and application of area fire
* Discuss the alternative application - a series of duels
* The square law equation
* Discuss the concept and application of aimed fire
and the mathematics of concentrated firepower
* Present Hughes' approximation to the square law for
engagements where losses are < 20%
* Introduce analysis of Iwo Jima and other attempts at model
validation
* The mixed law equation
* Discuss the application of mixed laws in modem combat
* Limitations of Lanchester laws
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Present law of exponential decay in combat
* Discuss application of law to self-attrition and examples of
Guadalcanal and Napoleon's march to Moscow
• Discuss Schneider's use of the exponential law and the significance
of the effectiveness coefficient
* Provide the student with an opportunity to use laws in examples
* Communicate the limitations and applicability of attrition models
* Discuss the idea of movement/suppression/domination vs.
attrition
• Discuss shock and mass and the need for treatment of "salvoes" or
"pulses" of combat power
* Surprise is hard to model
READINGS:
1. Washburn, "Lanchester Systems," pp. 1-10, 1985.
2. Lindsay, Glenn "Lanchester Equations," pp. 1-23, 1977.
3. Hughes, Wayne, Jr., "Straight-Lining Casualty Rates"
4. Schneider, James, Exponential Decay of Armies in Battle, pp. 100-
126, 1985.
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A. SIMULTANEOUS INFLICTION OF CASUALTIES
Early attempts at modeling the combat process used the attrition of forces as
a measurement of effectiveness to describe or predict battle outcomes. Attrition
modeling relates casualty rates to the number of forces on each side and their unit
effectiveness. It solves equations describing casualty rates in order to provide a
state equation which can be used to determine the remaining number of forces on
each side at any given time.
B. LANCHESTER LAWS
Frederick Lanchester derived simple equations to account for battle outcomes
based upon attrition rates. Each of his two equations can, in themselves, emulate
two different combat situations (Lindsay, 1977, pg. 1).
1. Linear Law (Washburn, 1985, pg. 9; Lindsay, 1977, pp. 2-5)
This law models the effects of "ancient" one-on-one combat where a
battle was a series of independent duels, each between exactly two combatants.
As one combatant triumphed over one opponent, another would take his place until
the succession of duels eventually left one side completely eliminated. The second
combat situation this law can be applied to is the exchange of unaimed fire
between forces where neither side can effectively target the other. In effect, each
force is firing an "area fire" pattern in an effort to inflict casualties by random
shots (Figure 11).
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One-on-One Combat Area Fire
Linear Law Combat Situations
Figure 11
"The rate of change form of the area fire linear law is:
dB dR_
(1) dB- =- _ RBdt dt
where: B = Blue Force strength
R = Red force strength
M = Effectiveness of B
M• = Effectiveness of R
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These rate equations yield the state equation of the linear law as
follows:
Bo - B
where: B., R. = initial force strengths
Bt, Rt = force strengths at time t
The final result of the battle can be predetermined by examining the
following ratios:
(2) B. < > R
If: "=. then outcome is a draw
">" then blue will eliminate red
"<" then red will eliminate blue
2. Square Law (Washburn, 1985, pp. 6-9, Lindsay, 1977, pp. 6-7)
When either side is able to simultaneously concentrate his its fire upon
the opponent (when one-on-one combat no longer applies) and is able to aim at
any and all targets on the other side, then the linear law no longer emulates the
combat. In this situation, the ability of forces to provide "aimed fire" at the enemy
becomes significant and a new equation must be employed to account for the
improved fire and infliction of casualties.
The name of the law is derived from the fact that the squares of the
fighting strengths appear in the state equation. The significance of the model is
the fact that the number of combatants engaged has greater influence on the
outcome of the battle than the attrition effectiveness of individual combatants.
The ability to aim fire at the enemy results in a squaring effect of the number of
forces fighting in a battle (Figure 12).
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Square Law Combat Situation
Figure 12
The rate of change form of the square law is:
(3) dB dRdt 'dt
where: B, R: represent force strength of Blue and Red
,&, ,&: attrition effectiveness coefficients of Blue and
Red
The rate equations yield the state equation of the square law:
B.' -Bt2 PR(4) R 0 2
__o2 - A
where: B., Ro: represent initial force strengths
BR, 1•: force strengths at time t
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The final result of the battle can be predetermined by examining the
following ratios:
(5) {2  }
if: "=" then outcome is a draw
">" then blue will eliminate red
"<" then red will eliminate blue
3. Hughes' Approximation To The Square Law
While the Lanchester square law provides a straightforward means of
determining force strength and outcome in a battle of annihilation, the fact is
obscured that most of the square law advantage accrues to the winner towards the
end of the battle. From history we know that average land battles will be broken
off when casualties are less than 10%. Even in a major battle, casualties seldom
exceed 30%. For battles when casualties are less than 20%, a linear
approximation of the square law will serve. For equation (3), we substitute:
(6) AB 8ffL; AR
AT AT
where (AB) and (AR) are the losses, B. - B, and R. - R, respectively, after AT,
which is now the duration of the battle. A comparison of the calculated outcome
with the formal square law will demonstrate that the difference is negligible when
casualties are low.
The corresponding state equation is:
(7) B. - B, _ &R.(7)L R /Jo
where: B,, R%: are the survivors of Blue and Red at time (t).
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Simply stated, in the early stages of a battle in which aimed fire
conditions hold, the ratio of blue losses to red losses is the inverse of the ratio of
the product of their respective attrition coefficient and initial force strengths.
4. Mixed Laws (Lindsay, 1977, pg. 9)
S. J. Deitchman suggested using the combination of Lanchester's linear
and square laws to model the outcome of a battle where only one force is able to
concentrate or aim its fire (Lindsay, 1977, pg. 9). Typical applications of this type
of mixed law include amphibious assaults, ambushes and guerrilla tactics. The
attrition equations for this law where Blue ambushes Red are:
(8) -dR = AB (from the square law); anddt
(9) -d -_ BR (from the linear law).
dt
The resulting state equation is:
(10) RB. - B, 2=Ro2 _ IL2 2PB
Assuming that Blue is able to continue the aimed fire and Red is unable
to seek cover or transition to aimed fire, the outcome of the engagement may be
predicted by:
(11) B.0Ro' '29




5. Limitations of Lanchester Laws
All of the Lanchester attrition equations presented have similar
limitations. The fundamental difference between the linear and square law
applications is the degree of control the commander is able to attain and maintain
over his troops and the situation. In his discussion of the effects of suppression,
James Schneider observes that "the square law .. assumes absolute and
simultaneous projection of force upon a target. In land warfare, this projection is
usually relative and only simultaneous at the decision point" (Schneider, 1985, pg.
88). This agrees with Hughes' assertion that combat is the functional, temporal
and spatial application of force. Thus, the underlying assumption of Lanchester's
square law, which requires that the concerted action of each combatant be
controlled, is frequently unobtainable in actual combat. Any failure of control
results in a breakdown not only in efficient targeting, which in effect degrades
performance from aimed (concentrated) fire to area (individual) fire, but also
reduces the ability or willingness of individual combatants to engage the enemy.
6. Solved Problems
Glenn F. Lindsay's article "Lanchester Equations" presents several
exercises for understanding the Lanchester equations. Three of his problems are
presented here with solutions so that the reader may see how the equations are
used.
PROBLEM I (pg. 19):
Given: Initial Red Force strength: 100.
Initial Blue Force strength: 120.
Red and Blue use aimed fire with kill rate 0.1 and 0.08, respectively.
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A _ 0.1 1.25
l 0.08
Thus, R° -,which implies that Blue wins.
B. Determine the final strength of the winner.
Bo2 - B' 2 _fiR
p 2 R 2  fiB'
Thus, 14400 - B,1  0.1
10000-0 0.08
Therefore, B,' = 14400 - 10000(1.25) = 1900.
Hence, Blue survives with 43.58 troops left.
Note that this shows one of the limitations of the Lanchester model, in that it
models a continuous loss curve with fractional outcomes, as opposed to a discrete
step-loss curve.
C. Determine how many elements Red would have needed to achieve a
victory.
For Red to win requires:-B2 <A
14400 0.1
Thus, 0  0.08
Therefore, R.2 > 14400(.8).
Hence, Red needs at least 108 elements to dominate Blue.
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PROBLEM 2 (pg. 19):
Given: Red force ambushes Green; Red uses aimed fire, Green responds
with area fire.
Initial Green strength: 150 men.
Initial Red strength: 25 men.
Red firing rate is 40 aimed shots per minute, with a single shot kill
probability of 0.2.
Implies: Red attrition coefficient is (40)(0.2) = 8 kills/nin.
Red is dispersed over 1000 square feet.
Area of each Red troop exposed: 0.2 square feet.
Green's probability of a kill against Red given a hit is 0.5.
A. Find the critical value for Green's rate of '-re. •iiat is, at what rate of fire
by Green, does the outcome of the battle change?
For parity,
Go2 2#R
Solve for, M = 2 x 8 x 25
(150)2
B {rate fire4){exposed areaR}{p(kill given hitG)1
(Red dispersal area)
Solve for the Green rate of fire: (2)(8)(25)(1000) = 177.8
(.2)(.5)(150)2
Therefore, if Green maintains a firing rate of 178 shots per minute, Green
will win. If Green's firing rate drops to 177, then Red will win.
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B. Determine the effect of changes to Green's rate of fire (rate)on Red's
residual strength, R, (Assume Red victory).
R=Ro am(G°')
2fiR
Thus, R, = 25- rate°(.2)('5)(150)
2
2(8)(1000)
In this equation RF is inversely proportional to rate,.
PROBLEM 4 (pg. 20):
Given: Combatants in wagon train: 50 men and women.
Indian combatants: 100 men.
Probability of a hit by wagon train members is three times that of the
Indians.
Firing rates are equal for both sides.
Cavalry arrives when 25 wagon train combatants remain.
Arriving cavalry forces have the same rate of fire and hit probability as the
Indians.
A. How many cavalry men need to be sent to defeat the Indians if the cavalry
arrives when there were only 25 wagon train members left?
(W.2W,) _W (502 252) 1(I., -V,) 3• I0 I'
Solving for 1, gives the number of Indians remaining to be 66, so the
number of cavalry men needed will be 67 (assuming the rate of fire and accuracy
is the same for the cavalry as it is for the Indians).
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B. If only 60 cavalry men are sent to assist the wagon train will there be any
survivors of the wagon train party when all battles are completed?
Assuming the Indians focus all their attention on the cavalry first, then the
number of Indians remaining after the cavalry is defeated is determined by:
(662- I,)2 1,(6' -1) i
so 1, = 28 Indians remaining.
Next solve for the outcome of a battle between 28 Indians and 25 people in
the wagon train:
(252) 1
since 0.7972 > 0.333, the wagon train party will win.
The number of wagon train survivors is determined by:
(252-W t2) I1
(282-0) =3
solving for W, gives 19 wagon train survivors.
C. EXPONENTIAL LAW
When control (distribution and concentration of fire) diminishes, the
probability increases that a given target receives more than one fatal or disabling
hit, and the net effectiveness of the fire decreases. Moreover, as command,
leadership and control over individual shooters diminishes, the ratio of firing
elements to inactive elements also declines. Those elements not providing fire
become mere "passive targets." In studying the works of BGen S.L.A. Marshall,
Schneider observed that only 15-25% of a unit would fire their weapons, and even
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then, not all of them would fire with any consistency or control (Schneider, 1985,
pp. 100-107). He concluded that, when the limitations imposed upon combat
operations by imperfect command and control and inactive shooters are taken into
account, the linear law should be modified by dropping the factor reflecting the
number of enemy shooters (Schneider, 1985, pp. 108-114). The resulting rate of





These equations imply that the loss of force is proportional to the size of the
force. Thus, while Lanchester holds that superior numbers result in superior
results, this model implies that a large force can expect greater losses than a small
force. After integrating these rate equations, the resulting state equations are:
B, - Boexp(-yIti
= Roexp[- At].
We do not have space to develop all of Schneider's rationale for this very
counter-intuitive conclusion. Note the following however. First, Schneider's
development is for ground combat. Second, the basis of his conclusion is from the
empirical evidence of ground combat. He goes on to offer explanations for this
strange data, but his theorizing (Schneider, 1985, pp. 108-126) is, unlike
Lanchester, solely for the purpose of explaining what historians have observed in
practice. Third, it should be remembered that the firing side is represented by the
attrition coefficient, y (gamma), and treating the coefficient as a constant is only
an approximation, since the firing side's fire will diminish as it suffers losses.
Even more important, the better trained, motivated and more numerous force will
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have the larger attrition coefficient. We may summarize by saying, the
exponential law asserts that loss rate to Red at any time during the battle will be
directly proportional to an unchanging fire effectiveness of Blue and to the number
of Red forces remaining at that time.
D. THE OPERATIONAL ART CONNECTION
This chapter is about combat rather than operations, but before concluding,
passing mention should be made of another application of the exponential law. In
a campaign of many weeks, losses from sickness have frequently exceeded losses
from enemy action. Examples of this are the French losses in Napoleon's invasion
of Russia and march to Moscow in 1812, and the US and Japanese losses in the
campaign for Guadalcanal from August 1942 to January 1943. In these instances,
the form of the loss equations is still exponential, but now the coefficients will
represent the rate of incidence of sickness of one's own forces, and similarly
represent the breakdown rate of tanks, aircraft and other vehicles.
E. THE COMMAND AND CONTROL CONNECTION
The fundamental difference between battles following the square law and
those following the exponential law is the degree of control maintained by the
commander over the situation. The closer command comes to bringing all its
forces into action without massing them so that they are easily targeted, and the
closer it comes to the ideal distribution of fire so that each shooter aims at a
different live and threatening target, the closer it comes to square law performance.
According to Schneider, "In land warfare Lanchester's square law is not the reality,
it is the ideal; but an ideal that must always be striven for .. (which) is, at the heart,
the spark of military genius" (Schneider, 1985, pg. 57).
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To the extent that a command and control system enables the commander to
direct and control the actions of his forces in combat and achieve square law
effects, the system may be seen as a force multiplier. Where both forces have
efficient command and control, the square law favors the side with superior
numbers. Where both have inferior command and control, the linear law favors
the force with better individual performance. Where both are massed so as to
become easy targets for the enemy, the exponential law favors the smaller force.
F. LIMITATIONS OF ATTRITION MODELS
Attrition-based models only provide insight into the effects of fire upon
remaining numerical strength. The ability to achieve the square law effects is
limited by terrain, in the case of land warfare, and by the commander's ability to
maintain control over his engaged forces. Three of the most prominent factors
affecting his ability to control his forces are the fog of war, friction and
suppression.
1. Fog of War, Friction and Suppression
The "fog of war" is the phenomenon of confusion that results when
humans under intense stress try to make decisions and communicate them. Fog of
war also implies uncertainty about the situation. In the lethal competition of
combat, the pressure to act in a timely way forces decisions to be made with
incomplete information. Several observers of military history have concluded that
the fog, confusion, uncertainty and lack of knowledge in combat, will continue to
occur unabated, despite all of the technological advances in scouting (information
gathering) and new and powerful means of information transmission such as
JTIDS (Joint Tactical Information Distribution System).
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Friction comes in two forms. One is the effect of the environment, both
terrain and weather. This is external friction. The other is the result of many
forces trying and failing to act in a fully cooperative and coordinated way. The
greater the number of forces, the greater the friction (inefficiency) that results; a
fact which is well known and which has been quantified by Trevor Dupuy in
Understanding War. This lack of fully coordinated action within a force is
internal friction.
Suppression is the reduction of actions brought about by enemy lethal
actions. Primary actions suppressed by enemy fire are own fire, movement,
communication and logistics or resupply. Another activity suppressed by enemy
action and not to be overlooked is the speed and quality of the decision making
process itself. Suppression is a special case of what may be called "resistance,"
that is, all actions taken (naturally including weapon fire) to reduce the effective
actions of the enemy.
The term Command and Control Warfare (C2W) was introduced in
Chapter II. C2W uses any means at hand to (1) prevent effective C2 of enemy
forces by denying information to, influencing, degrading or destroying his C2
process; and (2) maintain effective C2 of own forces by negating enemy efforts to
interfere with it. C2W is a particular form of suppression of the enemy C2 process
and denial of suppression by the enemy of one's own C2 process.
Insofar as this chapter is concerned, the thing to note is that fog of war,
friction and suppression are not inherent in Lanchester equations and are only
included indirectly (e.g., by degraded coefficients of unit effectiveness) if they are
included at all.
79
2. Intelligence, Deception and Maneuver
Effective firepower requires the allocation of the proper weapon or
force composition for a given objective. Thus, concentration is the result of
applying the right forces at the right time and place. To reduce an opponent's
ability to concentrate his combat power, a commander must apply his force in such
a way as to frustrate the opponent's attempts to mass his firepower at the decisive
place and time. This may be done in various ways, two of which are deception
and scouting. Deception attempts to mask the position of one's forces, or confuse
the enemy regarding one's intentions. The net effect is to cause doubt as to the
actual decisive point. Scouting, on the other hand, attempts to locate the vital
point at which the enemy should be struck.
Critical to massing firepower is maneuver. Freedom of movement on
the battlefield helps to achieve and maintain concentration. Furthermore, denying
the opponent freedom of movement ("the right forces at the right time and place")
helps to achieve a square law advantage. The square law artificially assumes
constant unit effectiveness and continuous attrition. This is only achieved when
the enemy is fixed in place.
3. Pulsed Firepower and Surprise
The continuous nature of fire of the square law is contrary to the nature
of much of modem warfare. As will be shown in the next chapter, about naval
combat, the trend toward aircraft carrier based forces and the use of stand-off
missiles has led to a pulsed delivery of firepower, where the combat power must
be measured as the result after each pulse, rather than the continuous process
modeled by Lanchester methods.
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One final factor not yet discussed which greatly impacts the results is
surprise, especially so when the firepower arrives in pulses. While its effect on
morale and troop posturing cannot be disputed, an elementary firepower model can
only presume that surprise occurs, but cannot investigate the processes by which
surprise is actually achieved.
G. SUMMARY
The following points should be understood as a summary of the attrition
modeling techniques developed in this chapter:
• The model form will vary according to the physical characteristics of the
battles. There is no general model, and the analyst must apply the form that
fits the conditions.
Insight into the quantitative value of C' contributions may be seen by the
way combat power is increased through coordinated (square law form)
versus uncoordinated activities (linear or exponential laws).
H. RELEVANCE TO FURTHER CURRICULUM COURSES
In this chapter, the student is introduced to the attrition equations developed
by Frederick Lanchester, along with other similar types of equations which model
different forms of combat. The Lanchester laws, as they have come to be known,
are used because they help our understanding of the value of numerical
superiority. Without a means of quantifying and mathematically describing force-
on-force encounters and their results, all military analysis would be based solely
on historical evidence and war games. This would leave great room for
inaccuracies due to personality influences. Every military computer model, every
military wargame, utilizes some means of evaluating and describing the effects of
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force encounters within its designed boundaries. Many of these models use
Lanchester-like attrition models within them. Often, results of simulations and
war games are represented solely by "killer-victim scoreboards" (which arms
achieved the casualties against which enemy units). That is why the student must
understand how these encounters are described and how they are evaluated.
Several courses utilize the equations themselves or base much of their content
upon an understanding of how similar equations work. OS 3008, Analytical
Planning Methodology and OS 3603, Simulation and Wargaming, both use the
Lanchester laws and introduce other similar equations and techniques in order to
demonstrate their course objectives. In OS 3008, detection models, mixed strategy
formulations and search effectiveness functions are used in order to show how to
optimize the allocation of resources. After examining the concepts through
manual calculations, computer models employing commercial software are
employed in order to speed up the work and provide experience for the student. In
OS 3603, statistical evaluation techniques are employed in order to evaluate
outcomes measured in casualties based on Lanchester laws and other similar force-
on-force equations. In addition, the student begins to put the laws and equations to
use within actual computer models, both in class and utilizing working military
combat models. Finally, CC 4003, C3 Systems Evaluation, examines how the
models themselves work based upon the computer encoded equations.
i. REVIEW QUESTIONS
1. Differentiate between the classical Lanchester square law and Hughes'
approximation to the square law. Which formula is more "technically"
correct? What purpose or usefulness does the other equation provide?
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2. What are the necessary conditions for the linear and square law to hold?
What must be done if the necessary conditions do not hold?
3. Given that an individual (blue) shooter can fire at a rate of 5 rounds per
minute, each opponent (gray) provides a target area of 0.165 square feet
(6 in x 4 in) and the field of fire is 30,000 sq. ft (100 yds deep, 100 ft
wide), calculate the individual effectiveness coefficient for the blue
shooters if the field contains 50 gray troops, assuming that the enemy is
providing sufficient suppressive fire to cause the shooters to only fire at
a wide area sporadically.
4. Given that each blue shooter in the above question presents a 0.33
square foot target to the opponent and that each opponent is capable of
placing his round in a 1 square foot area at the same rate, determine the
single shot hit probability for the gray shooters. If the probability of a
kill given a hit is 0.5, then determine the overall effectiveness
coefficient for a typical gray shooter.
5. For problem 3, determine the initial blue troop level necessary to ensure
a blue victory (at least one blue shooter remaining) in a fight to the
death. Is it reasonable to assume that blue would continue the fight
under these circumstances (Why or why not)?
6. Given that blue has less than the minimum number of troops necessary
as determined by problem 4, name three measures which blue may take
to increase his likelihood of a favorable outcome.
7. Assuming that blue is able to transition to aimed fire, has 100 troops
remaining at the time of transition, each with the same rate of fire and
probability of kill given a hit as a typical gray shooter, use Hughes'
approximation to determine the resulting troop strengths, given that gray
has only 40 troops remaining when the transition occurs and is willing
to lose only 4 more men.
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8. According to the linear and square laws, the effect of doubling one
side's effectiveness coefficient is to double the rate of losses incurred by
the other. Determine the effect of doubling the effectiveness coefficient
on the exponential decay model. Which factor then has more
significance in the final troop strength, initial troop level or the
opponent's effectiveness?
9. As a consequence of Section F, Limitations of Attrition Models, why
does it make sense to think of a command and control system as
resulting in a force "diminisher" vice multiplier?
10. Discuss methods which a commander may take to limit the ability of his
opponent to achieve square law effects.
11. Cohesion may be defined as spiritual bonding or morale within a force.
Explain why force cohesion is important in battle. In your opinion,
what was the benefit of drum and fife corps in battle?
12. Why is it important for shooters to return fire when pinned down?
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VI. NAVY BATTLE MODELING
AIM:
Review naval combat in history to show that while force against force and
attrition have been dominant in the nature of naval combat, their manifestation,
and therefore the appropriate model of sea combat, has changed during four
periods. The Lanchester (continuous fire) model has to be replaced in modern
combat with a pulsed power model. Introduce tactical decision aids.
OBJECTIVES:
* Present five cornerstones of maritime warfare
* Distinguish the great trends from the constants of naval combat
* Discuss the functions (processes) of naval combat -- shooting, scouting, C2
and their antitheses
a Look at the evolution of naval combat and effect on C2 in terms of
modeling of various force-on-force engagements:
0 The age of the fighting sail and the smooth bore gun (continuous fire
between ships)
* The age of steam and rifled gun (continuous fire between fleets)
• The age of aircraft carriers (pulsed firepower)
* The missile age
* Review the modern naval force-on-force model in terms of
missile attack and defense
• Emphasize that models of naval combat are attrition-based
• "Scouting" must be included for complete understanding of C2
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Examine the increasing role of tactical decision aids as used by the Navy
READINGS:
1. Hughes, Wayne, Jr., "Naval Pulsed Firepower Combat Model,"
1988.
2. Snyder, Frank, Command and Control: Readings and Commentary,
"Session 4 - Operational Decisions: Decision Aids," pp. 47-57, 1989.
REFERENCE:




At this point, the reader will recognize that Lanchester laws are simply tools
which must be correctly chosen and applied to create a useful combat model.
Formulas are only tools describing combat phenomena in a simplified, essential
way. Effective combat modeling involves much more than a simple understanding
of mathematical formulas and their applications.
By studying naval combat, the reader will be able to see how basic formulas
can be applied to understand past naval warfare and to develop models describing
naval combat for the future. The limitations of the laws discussed in the previous
chapter indicate that there must be other tools to simulate the environments and
situations not covered by the Lanchester laws. In order to create useful combat
models, it is necessary to have a collection of tools other than just mathematical
equations at your disposal. These other "tools" include: understanding the
historical application of force in the type of warfare being analyzed (naval warfare
in this case), and an understanding of the trends and constants observed through
history. In his book, Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice, CAPT. Wayne Hughes
(USN Ret.) addresses the historical perspective of naval combat and the "tools"
that a combat modeler must be familiar with in order to understand the nature of
naval warfare. This chapter discusses some aspects of naval combat from Fleet
Tactics, shows the change in the applicable formulas for naval battles, and
introduces tactical decision aids.
B. CORNERSTONES OF MARITIME WARFARE
In understanding the history of naval warfare, five cornerstones of naval
combat must be kept in view at all times. (Hughes, 1986, pp. 24-25):
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* Men matter most,
• Doctrine is the glue of tactics,
* To know tactics, know technology,
* The seat of purpose is on the land,
* Attack effectively first.
The cornerstones of naval combat will be discussed in class.
C. PROCESSES OF NAVAL COMBAT
Naval combat is best described as a collection of processes, called activities
in Chapter II. For combat on the seas, the processes can be reduced to delivery of
firepower, counterforce activity, scouting and anti-scouting. The concerted effects
of these processes are directed by the commander by a C2 process and opposed by
the enemy's C2 countermeasures. The result is delivered combat power.
The processes fundamental to naval combat are (Hughes, 1986, pp. 145-146):
• Attrition. Naval combat is an attrition process which results from the
effective delivery of firepower.
"* Scouting. The ability to strike effectively first is a direct result of the
scouting process.
"* C2. The conversion of potential into combat power is the process of
command and control.
The processes of shooting, scouting and C2 have antitheses. These are
employed by a commander in the protection of his forces. The activities are
designed to reduce the enemy's ability to deliver effective firepower, his scouting
effectiveness and C2 ability. These functions are called counterforce, anti-
scouting and C2 countermeasures (C2CM). The purpose of counterforce is to
reduce the effect of enemy firepower by defensive fire, protective armor, damage
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control and other such means. Anti-scouting uses whatever means available to
disrupt enemy scouts and delay detection or tracking, in order to allow the
advantage of the first strike to friendly forces. C2CM activities are those
associated with disrupting the enemy's ability to make decisions, disseminate
battlefield information and deliver orders to his own forces.
Space and Electronic Warfare (SEW), introduced in Chapter II, is a Navy
term and organization that governs the development of systems associated with
scouting and anti-scouting, and for pragmatic reasons, also many systems for C2
and C2CM. It has had widespread effect toward giving these systems the attention
they deserve for modern naval operations. As a result, the Space and Electronic
Warfare Commander (SEWC) has gained full warfare commander status in the
Navy's Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) structure.
Command and Control Warfare (C2W) also previously defined in Chapter II
is an all-service concept which attempts to protect friendly C2 processes and
diminish the enemy's C2.
D. GREAT TRENDS AND CONSTANTS OF NAVAL COMBAT
In order for a modeler to develop good models for predictions, he must
understand the trends of the processes being modeled. Then the trends may be
reflected in the model which attempts to emulate the processes. A model of naval
warfare must be true to the nature of combat at sea. Several of the key trends
which have affected the process of naval combat are (Hughes, 1986, pg. 196):
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"* The shift of emphasis from speed of platform to speed of weapon.
"• Scouting has replaced the importance of ship maneuverability.
"* The range of weapons has increased significantly.
"* The lethality of weapons has increased significantly.
* Counterforce (cover, deception, dispersion, defensive firepower) has
replaced the notion of survival through armor, sheer size, better damage
control, etc.
"* Not only has the scouting process gained in importance, but the rate and
range of scouting and surveillance has increased significantly.
"* To circumvent the increase in effectiveness and range of weapons, anti-
scouting has played a large role to keep forces undetected for as long as
possible.
"* The application of pulsed power may result in a victory for an inferior force
in modem naval battles that was not possible until World War II.
The constants which must be accounted for in a model must be understood
and enforced in a manner similar to the trends. Several of the key constants of
naval warfare are (Hughes, 1986, pg. 197):
"• The purpose of maneuver is to create an advantage in position relative to
the enemy.
"* The ability to fire effectively first is the primary way to win a naval battle.
"* Defense plays a smaller role in naval combat than in land combat.
"* There is never enough scouting capacity or information.
"* Commanders must be prepared to reallocate resources to improve scouting
or surveillance even at the expense of firepower.
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E. EVOLUTION OF NAVAL TACTICS
The history of naval combat has developed through several notable periods of
evolution in both tactics employed and technology available. The periods of
interest include: the age of the fighting sail and the smooth bore gun, the age of
steam and rifled gun, the age of the aircraft carriers and the missile age. By means
of class lectures, the student will gain an understanding of the utility of attrition-
based models to describe the six processes of naval combat.
1. Age Of The Fighting Sail And Smooth Bore Gun (Hughes, 1986, pp.
40-54)
In the age of the fighting sail and smooth bore gun we see: the
noticeable effect of concentration of firepower in the individual ship and the first
use of C', the purpose of which was "merely" to control and maneuver fleets
effectively. Concentration of firepower was achieved in this period by two basic
means. The first was to put more guns on a ship by producing double and triple
deck ships to fight in the line. Only one ship's gunfire could be concentrated
against another, so that the conditions for the square law held for single ship duels.
The second means was the fighting column of ships which allowed a commander
to bring all of his ships together to form a concerted effort in battle. But because
effective range of the guns was short, duels between individual ships resulted, and
the linear law's condition held (Figure 13) for the column as a whole. The
command of ships was simplified by the fighting line by placing the flagship in the
middle of the line so that message flags could be read by all the ships in the line.
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Example of one side's gun range while in a column
in order to concentrate firepower
Figme 13
2. Age Of Steam And Rifled Gun (Hughes, 1986, pp. 55-84)
The age of steam propulsion and the rifled gun was marked by
technological advances in fabrication of steel hulls and weapons. One of the
biggest trends highlighting this period was the use of steel and armor in warships.
The stronger, armor protected ships could take more direct hits and still be a strong
adversary. In addition to being stronger, the increase in maneuverability provided
by steam propulsion plants allowed the commander to go directly into the wind,
with new possibilities in formation and strategies. Tacticians were at first in
disagreement over how best to use these ships in naval combats, some favoring
their use as rams to swiftly destroy an unsuspecting line of ships.
Another important trend was a marked increase in the range and
lethality of weapons brought on by rifled guns. The range of effective weapons
was drastically increased from 300-500 yards to 8-10 miles. The increased range
of weapons gave fleet commanders a new possibility for concentrating force.
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These new weapons allowed the commander to concentrate the firepower of any
and all of his ships against any ship in a concentrated enemy formation, and so
square law conditions held between whole fleets. This long range fire settled the
tactical debate and led to the reemergence of the battle line or fighting column
(Hughes, 1986, pg. 67). Crossing the enemy's "T" then became the tactical goal of
every fleet (Figure 14). The importance of being able to quickly form a single
battleline out of several columns (employed for cruising) emphasized the need for
more scouting and reconnaissance information.
++•
Only the forwar gunsI......of theladingf h.
can be brought to bear
Crossing the Enemy's "T"
Figure 14
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Another debate was whether the tactical commander should be in the
middle (for signaling purposes) or in the first ship (for simplified follow-the-leader
maneuvering). The wireless radio and extensive signal codeS developed during
this period altered the command and control aspects of naval combat. The flagship
no longer had to be placed in the center of the formation and the scouting and
reconnaissance ships could be placed well out of sight of the main formation yet
still communicate by radio.
3. Age Of Aircraft Carriers (Hughes, 1986, pp. 111-139)
The age of steam and the rifled gun gave way after World War I to the
age of aircraft carriers. The effect that naval air power has had on naval combat in
terms of trends, tactics and strategy is rivaled only by the effects the missile has
had on modem naval combat scenarios. The ability to launch aircraft from the
carriers and attack at ranges twenty times greater than guns had decisive effects on
the sea battles of World War II.
Aircraft squadrons gave naval forces two major improvements over the
age of steam. The first improvement involved the range of scouting and
reconnaissance efforts. Aircraft provided long range scouting, which dramatically
affected the chances of making the first strike. The second improvement involved
the concentration of firepower of an air wing in time. The result was a "pulsed
firepower" battle (Figure 15). A one-page paper found in the readings, "Naval
Pulsed Firepower Combat Model," provides a model that shows the outcome of
these pulsed fire engagements between aircraft carriers and their air wings.
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The increase in range and lethality due to carrier
pulsed firepower
Figure 15
The age of the aircraft carrier provides an excellent opportunity to apply
attrition modeling to five actual engagements observed during World War II. In
Fleet Tactics, Hughes applied a simple tactical model of carrier warfare to
demonstrate how a pulsed firepower attrition model accurately describes the
carrier engagements in the Pacific (Hughes, 1986, pp. 93-103). This model fitted
the historic battle outcomes and showed that the Lanchester continuous fire model
was obsolete.
One of the most important of the trends observed in this period was the
technological breakthroughs in sensory equipment. With the capability to conduct
large air strikes hundreds of miles away from the carrier, the need for longer range
sensor information is obvious. The technological revolution in radar, electronic
support measures (ESM), jamming and air defense communications all
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coordinated in a combat information center (CIC) were paramount to the success
of US forces had in naval battles with the Japanese.
4. Age Of Missiles (Hughes, 1986, pp. 240-264)
The increases in range and lethality of weapons which occurr,..: during
the age of the aircraft carriers were overtaken by yet another transition by the
introduction of land air and sea based missiles. The tvend of developing longer
reaching weapons and the development of long range tactical and strategic missiles
has had significant impact on the tactics of naval combat. Inclusive with the range
and lethality of these new missiles are: a potecltial to concentrate firepower from
widely separated ships and aircraft (Figure 16), a need for better scouting and
reconnaissance equipment and strategies -- including the roles of decreasing the
enemy's ability to scout effectively and the need for a more coordinated C2 system
to deal with an environment to enhance friendly force's capabilities while stifling
the enemy's ability to perform well -- C2CM. (The model described in Fleet
Tactics, Chapter 10, will be presented in a class lecture. It takes into account the
current capabilities of long range missiles and the ability of forces to scout and
perform C2CM functions to enhance the probabilities of a first strike.)
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The effect of concentrated missile firepower
Figure 16
F. FUNCTION OF SCOUTING
The function of scouting has been a recurring issue in naval combat from the
earliest age of the sail ship to the modem age of missile warfare. The need to
know not only where the enemy is but what his capabilities are, has been shown to
turn many battles into victories for the inferior fleet. The importance of scouting
in naval tactics provides a dilemma for the current force commander. On the one
hand, scouting provides obvious benefits in the advantage given to the force which
conducts the most effective scouting. On the other hand, scouting reduces the
number of forces which can be drawn upon for firepower while the scouts are
engaged in scouting and reconnaissance. The tradeoff between ready firepower
and forces engaged in search ard tracking must be carefully weighed by the force
commander (and combat modeler) in order to determine an optimum balance.
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G. TACTICAL DECISION AIDS (Snyder, 1988, pp. 49-53)
Such problems as scouting versus firepower and choices of weapons to use
against specific targets in a modem conflict has led to the use of tactical decision
aids. The most significant origin of decision aiding began in World War II as
operational analysis work was being conducted to help commanders make better
tactical decisions and use the best force employment techniques (Snyder, 1988, pg.
49). The development of these decision aids is directly related to being able to
follow the trends and constants of naval combat and the ability to apply the proper
modeling parameters to the situation.
H. RELEVANCE TO FURTHER COURSES
This chapter examined the trends and constants of naval warfare drawing
much of its material from Fleet Tactics. The chapter shows how naval warfare has
evolved, and thus how modeling formulas have likewise evolved. In order to
determine how combat can be effectively modeled, the student must have some
sense of how it has changed over the years, what factors have caused the change
and how those factors can be applied to other areas of warfare in order to try and
predict the changes there. This sense of historical evaluation gives the student an
effective tool which, when applied to other areas of study, can help bring into
focus "the big picture." Modeling and combat analysis do not take place within a
vacuum and there must be a sense of "how we got where we're at" in order to
understand constant, unchanging factors and possible future trends and how they
can affect what may be required down the road. As we've said before, the old
saying goes, "It's not, 'let's model so we can understand combat,' but 'let's
understand combat so we can model it."'
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Several courses in the curriculum use ideas presented here along with
material from Chapter VII, which is more centered on ground combat. OS 3008,
Analytical Planning Methodology; OS 3603, Simulation and Wargaming; CC
4001, C3 Systems Engineering; CC 4003, C3 Systems Evaluation; CC 4750,
Military C3 Systems; and CC 4913, Policies & Problems in C3, all deal with naval
warfare in one way or another. Either they explore the modeling techniques of
attrition based models, such as OS 3008 and OS 3603, or they deal with larger
issues and problems within the Navy itself, such as CC 4750 and CC 4913. In
either case, the information presented within this chapter gives valuable
background as to the history of naval warfare, trends contributing to that history
and how the Navy "fights the ship."
I. REVIEW QUESTIONS
1. List the five cornerstones of maritime warfare as defined by Hughes
and describe how each affects command and control.
2. Describe the processes that result in delivery of combat power at sea.
Contrast these with the functional approach of SEW andC2W.
3. Describe the evolution of combat power at sea, in terms of changes
in weapon range and lethality and the effect on choice of model of
naval combat at different periods of history.
4. Assess the impact of changes in weapon delivery mode on the
importance of the warship maneuverability. Will new weapons have
a similar affect on the desirability of aircraft maneuverability?
5. Why is it so important in naval warfare to attack effectively first?
How can this capability be maintained in peacetime by a country
whose foreign policy denounces a first strike capability?
6. How have advances in communications technologies affected naval
command and control?
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7. Given the following: A. = 12 Bo = 8
a, = 0.5 b, = 0.5
a2 = 2 b2 = 2
a =2 13=4
CA 0.5 orB= 0.5
a. Use the Naval Pulsed Firepower Combat Model to compute
the number of survivors, A, and B1, for a single exchange of
salvoes. Answer: a, = 7, b1 = 4.
b. Side A determines that if he can cut his defensive firepower in
half (a, = 0.25) he will double his offensive targeting
accuracy (O"A = 1.0). What effect will this have on A, and B,
(assuming all other values remain constant)? Answer: a1 =
5.5, b, = 0.
8. How has the development of stand-off missiles impacted the
development of naval tactics? How does this affect the modeler and
the modeling process?
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VII. NON-ATTRITION BASED MODELS
AIM:
We have seen that attrition models of ground combat do not cover important
factors such as suppression, friction, strong positions, maneuver and fighting spirit.
Now we show that these attrition models are not adequate in explaining the
outcomes of battles, and how an advantageous position or maneuver play
important roles in determining the outcome of a battle, in addition to the
commander's interpretation of the situation. "Breakpoints" and their use in current
modeling practices are examined along with some non-attrition modeling
techniques in use.
OBJECTIVES:
* Present the idea of mission accomplishment being measured in terms other
than attrition, explicitly domination of the enemy (or control of the situation
to one's own ends)
• Examine the role of suppression as a measure of dominance.
* Discuss McQuie's article on breakpoints
* Introduce breakpoint phenomenon
* How breakpoints are established
• Examine the trends of dominance of maneuver over attrition
* Introduce the effect of battlefield impressions on command decision
vice measuring actual losses during combat
* Emphasize that a typical engagement results in a withdrawal of forces vice
a fight to the death
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Discuss methods of estimating combat potential and power
* Use of fire power indices as combat potential
* The basic form of the relationships and the applications
* The limitations of fire power indices
* The QJM approach to represent combat power
* The basic approach of the relationship and the applications
* The limitations of QJM
* The dimensional incompatibility of the model
* No power distribution and tactics ("black box effect")
Present a model of nuclear arms race as an example of graphical modeling
techniques
Discuss the Russian Correlation of Forces and Means (COFM) method as
an extreme use of decision aids using non-attrition models
* The basic form of the model
* The limitation of the model
READINGS:
1. McQuie, Robert, "Battle Outcomes: Casualty Rates as a Measure of
Defeat," Army, pp. 30-34, November 1987.
2. Dupuy, Trevor, Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat,
pp. 39-50, 81-89, 1987.
3. Giordano, Frank and Maurice Weir, A First Course in Mathematical
Modeling, pp. 4-15, 1985.
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A. MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT
At this point, the reader should recognize the limits of attrition models.
Typically, the final outcome was determined by a battle to the end where one side
loses most or all of its forces. In reality, this situation rarely occurs. Analysis
should be developed that more closely resembles ground combat with non-attrition
models.
One approach is to look at how a commander would answer two questions:
"How many losses am I willing to suffer before conceding my aim (mission) to the
enemy?" and "What other factors influence my decision to retreat or surrender?"
What casualty total is sufficient to cause the commander to admit defeat? Is the
number as high as 50%, or is it closer to 10%? In what ways is it dependent upon
the commander, his mission and the particular engagement?
What factors affect the commander's decision to admit defeat and how can
these factors be modeled for analysis? The possibilities include: domination -- if a
commander feels that he is outmatched in the battle, he may retreat early;
maneuver -- if one side's forces are outflanked, they will be surrounded or if they
withdraw before they are incapable of maneuvering and become forced to
surrender; and the environment itself -- a commander whose forces are battling in
an unfamiliar environment may not feel as comfortable with the high casualty rate
and may retreat earlier than expected. The student should pause here and reflect
on other possible factors.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the limited number of models and
techniques for accounting for some of the other factors which strongly influence
combat outcomes in the real world.
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B. SUPPRESSION
In his book, Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat, Trevor
Dupuy (Col. USA, Ret.) addresses the importance of suppression in determining
the outcome of battles. He defines suppression as "the degradation of hostile
operational capabilities through the employment of military action that has
psychological and/or physical effects [which] temporarily [impair] the combat
performance of enemy forces and personnel who have not themselves been killed
or wounded" (Dupuy, 1987, pg. 252). As discussed earlier, the use of suppression
limits a force's ability to,,achieve the hyperbolic attrition effects predicated by
Lanchester's Square Law.
The effects of suppression were readily addressed by S.L.A. Marshall when
he observed that under the influence of enemy fire, soldiers would neglect the
training and doctrine taught to them, calling for return of fire, to force the enemy
to also go to ground {refer to Chapter V reading: (Schneider, 1985, pg. 104)).
Schneider's account of the Battle of Gettysburg graphically depicts the effects of
terror, induced by suppression, on battlefield discipline {(Schneider, 1985, pg. 97)
not included in your reading). According to Schneider, many of the weapons
recovered after the battle were loaded with multiple rounds, to the point of
becoming a veritable pipe bomb, in addition to improperly loaded weapons which
became essentially useless. The effect of suppression and demoralization
effectively removed many soldiers from the battle. A more recent example of the
effects of suppression on training and doctrine could be seen during Desert Storm.
Iraqi Scud missile launchers, the object of intensive search and destroy missions
by Coalition air forces, had little time to fully set up and aim their missiles. As a
result, there was little or no accuracy in missile delivery, compared with what was
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technically possible. Thus, by maintaining constant pressure on the Scud missile
crews, Coalition air forces effectively suppressed the effectiveness of weapons
delivery.
Dupuy says that the amount of suppression is a function of the explosive
power of the munitions employed, the number of rounds fired and the rate at
which the fire was delivered. Additionally, the period of time that the suppressive
fire was delivered impacted upon its effectiveness: the longer the fire was
delivered, the greater the cumulative effect.
Dupuy notes that the effects of suppressive fire are blatantly left out of both
wargaming and field exercises. He contends that it is essential for US personnel to
be exposed to the reality of suppression and its impact on the battlefield.
Thus, more data on the effects of suppression should be gathered. Such data
would provide a means of measuring the ability of a commander to dominate the
enemy through firepower. Marshall's analysis revealed that forces held down by
suppressive fire for just a couple of days became morally broken, and attempts to
continue the engagement using those forces were futile (Schneider, 1985, pg. 104).
This situation became readily evident during Desert Storm when, after being
battered by weeks of heavy bombings, the Iraqi ground forces quickly surrendered
to Coalition forces after little or no resistance. Thus, through suppression and
demoralization, a force could dominate the battlefield and win its objective with
relatively small attrition on his side, and sometimes the enemy's side as well.
C. BREAKPOINTS
Robert McQuie's article, "Battle Outcomes: Casualty Rates As a Measure of
Defeat" (Army, Nov. 1987) examined the relationship between casualty rates in
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modem warfare and conflicts, and battle outcomes. McQuie referred to the
moment when a force commander accepts that the battle is lost as "the breakpoint"
(McQuie, 1987, pg. 33). In his analysis of data from 80 modem battles
accumulated by the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO),
McQuie attempted to find a cause-and-effect relationship for battle outcomes.
McQuie found that on average, defenders were willing to accept a casualty
ratio, with respect to initial force strength, that was twice as great as an attacker's
before admitting defeat. Nonetheless, he found that the median casualty levels for
defenders and attackers were only eight and four percent, respectively. This was
far less than the levels normally used for combat simulations to determine
breakpoints. Exchange rates experienced prior to breakpoints followed the same
general pattern: defenders were willing to accept losses at a rate approximately
two and a half times as great as attackers.
But McQuie also concluded that neither the number of casualties experienced
in battle nor the rate at which they were experienced was a driving factor in the
outcome of the battle. More significant to the outcome of battles were the ability
of the enemy to maneuver, the withdrawal of adjacent friendly forces and a
commander's perception of near-term developments. These three factors may have
a high degree of correlation, in that, as a commander recognizes the ability of the
enemy to envelop his forces or his inability to effectively position his own forces,
he may sense the futility of continuing the exchange. This is compatible with
Marshall's finding that once the thrust of an attack is broken and the attackers are
forced to go to the ground, it is very unlikely that the impetus can be restored
(Schneider, 1985, pp. 104-105). Thus, McQuie holds that effective commanders
seldom commit their forces to a suicidal situation.
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As pointed out by Morse and Kimball, the data available to the commander is
often tainted (dirty). It may reflect inaccuracies induced by the heat of battle and
overestimation of both casualties sustained by friendly forces and casualties
inflicted upon the enemy. Because of the inaccuracies, the perception in the mind
of the decision maker is the basis of the decision. This may cause him to withdraw
from a battle he can win or continue even when the battle is beyond redemption.
McQuie holds that, in battle, commanders are "prudent and cautious" with respect
to continuing an engagement which appears to be unwinable.
McQuie concludes that most battles are decided by factors other than
casualties. Further, he found that the majority of engagements were terminated
with less than a ten percent casualty level. Clearly, except in extreme cases, a
fight to the death is atypical for land combat, and thus the value of Lanchester
attrition models is limited.
D. METHODS OF ESTIMATING COMBAT POTENTIAL AND POWER
1. Firepower Index
A simple non-attrition modeling technique employs the use of firepower
indices. A firepower index aggregates a set of heterogeneous elements of force
into a single number which represents the combat potential of the forces. To do
this, the model assigns a unit value to the weapon with the lowest kill potential
(such as a rifle) and scales the values for the other weapons relative to the lowest
valued weapon. The individual weapon index is then multiplied by the number of
weapons of that type in the force. The sum of the values are compared for each
side and the highest scoring side is assumed to have the greater combat potential.
It is accepted that the comparison cannot determine relative combat powe,
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because that depends on the two commanders' actual deployments in battle. The
firepower indices assigned are generally determined on an historical basis, by
examining the effects of the various weapons relative to other weapons over
numerous battles.
Table 1 is an example of a firepower index model:
TABLE 1
I Force Type T Unit Value , Number of Units Index
Infantry 01 200 200
Tanks 20 20 400
APCs 10 10 100
Artillery 15 20 300
Total 1000
Although this is a better model than just counting the number of forces
on each side, this model suffers from several serious drawbacks. First, the
firepower indices are static values which do not take into account such factors as
effectiveness in different terrain or environments, mobility or offensive versus
defensive uses. Second, the indices are assumed to be linear -- the sum value of 1
tank + 1 tank = 2 tanks. This discounts the additive firepower effect of multiple
units and the psychological value of advancing with large divisions vice a few
tanks. This linearity also assumes that 100 men are 100 times as effective as a
single man thereby neglecting the problems of friction associated with controlling
and advancing the much larger group.
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Finally, the model suffers from synergism in that the sum of artillery,
tanks, infantry, etc., is more than just the values assigned to the organic units.
This is a static model which is only effective in comparing the potential of two
sides. It cannot be used to estimate battle outcomes or probable losses, but only
which side has the advantage in forces.
2. Quantitative Judgment Method (QJM)
In the early 1800's, the influential works of Carl Von Clausewitz
implied a Law of Numbers that would model military conflict. This work (On
War) was seen by Dupuy to correspond to his Quantitative Judgment Method
(QJM). The QJM was developed in the 1950's to account for a number of factors
which influence the outcome of battle but were not accounted for in the attrition
models presented earlier.
In Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat, Dupuy derived a
combat power formula based on Clausewitz's Law of Numbers. The Law related
combat power (P) to the number of troops available (N), a term representing the
variable factors affecting the force (V), and a value assigned to the fighting quality
of the troops (Q) by the simple relationship:
P=NxVxQ.
Dupuy's QJM combat power formula derivation may be obtained through a three
step process (Dupuy, 1987, pp. 81-89):
"* Replace the number of troops (N) with force strength (S).
"* Quantify and define the variable factors (Vf) which influence the
circumstances of combat on the force.
"* Replace the troop quality factor (Q) with a relative Combat Effectiveness
Value (CEV).
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The QJM method replaced the force manpower term with a force
strength term, a "Firepower Index," in order to account for the lethality and
effectiveness of all weapons in the force. The force strength term developed in the
QJM is based on historical data and empirical results, adjusting over the course of
history in order to obtain current values. Force strength corresponds to combat
potential. The QJM model has determined a finite number of variables which
affect combat, classified as either environmental (terrain, weather, etc.) or
operational (posture, mobility, etc.). Dupuy conducted a historical analysis,
assigning to each factor, a value based upon its importance in combat and its
relative impact upon effectiveness. Finally, the Combat Effectiveness Value is the
ratio of theoretical combat outcomes to actual outcomes and is a substitute for the
Clausewitzian term (Q), in that, it is a measure of relative combat effectiveness of
one side's force against the other due to leadership, training, etc. Thus, the
resulting QJM combat power formula is:
P=Sx V, xCEV.
The limitations of the QJM lie in the historical approach taken to obtain
the values of force strength (S) and Combat Effectiveness (CEV). This model is a
statistical curve fitting endeavor with a large number of parameters, it is
challenging to obtain a good input for CEV. Another significant drawback is that
this model does not describe how the different factors actually affect the battle and
does not account for the dynamics of combat such as the opposing tactics or the
effects of maneuver and suppression. This model does address the problem of
how to distribute force across a battlefield in order to obtain the optimum use of
combat power.
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E. GRAPHICAL MODELING TECHNIQUES
Students were first exposed to the use of graphs when learning to analyze
simple linear equations. Later, this technique was applied to complicated systems
of linear equations. In their book, A First Course in Mathematical Modeling,
Frank Giordano and Maurice Weir use this technique for modeling one complex
relationship. The technique was applied extensively by the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and other arms reduction treaty organizations.
GrapHical analysis of complex issues requires that the issues be reduced to
the relationship between a single independent variable and a dependent variable.
In their analysis of the nuclear arms race between the US and the former Soviet
Union, Giordano and Weir limited the variables to the number of missiles or
warheads possessed by either country. In order to model the close interrelation
between the two force structures, the graphs of each country's projected missile
requirements, which satisfied their own strategies, were overlaid. The result was a
method of determining the effect of changes of one country's strategy to the
number of weapons required by the other.
In general, the limitation of this method is a common one -- the results
require subjective interpretation. This may be seen with the nuclear arms model.
The actual number of missiles required to satisfy the friendly strategy of each
country in the model is not explicitly determined. Nor is the survivability index
which determines the actual slope of the curves used to depict the number of
missiles or warheads possessed. Thus, the model is more beneficial in describing
the effects (trends) caused by changes to either country's nuclear strategy than it is
in prescribing force levels and policies.
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Many policy analysts and negotiators regard the model's "weakness," its
strength: it provides a vivid assessment of the likely effects of strategy or policy
changes. Similar models can be generated for other complex military problems.
The key is to agree on critical relationships governing the problem and then
describe them graphically.
F. RUSSIAN CORRELATION OF FORCES AND MEANS (COFM)
In order to prepare for war, the former Soviet, and now, Russian military
always considered it important to study history scientifically (logically and
quantitatively). The result of years of operations research in military history is the
Russian Correlation of Forces and Means (COFM) still in use in Russian military
doctrine. An article in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia (1979) emphasized that
COFM is an operational, tactical and strategic model used at all echelons of the
military (Dupuy, 1987, pp. 39-50). The aim of COFM is to give the fighting
power (we would say combat power) of both sides, based on a correlation of the
forces available to each side and the means required to achieve stated objectives,
in order to compute the probable victor and estimate the range of casualties likely.
Thus, the Soviet view took a more sanguine view over the predictive power of
combat models than the US armed services.
According to doctrine, a COFM-computed margin of advantage (a ratio) is to
be gained at the critical fronts prior to an attack. As a battle progresses, the model
is updated and if an insufficient margin is determined to exist at critical places,
then forces are shifted appropriately to enhance the margin to ensure victory.
Like Dupuy's QJM, the COFM model also takes into account variables such
as: training, experience of command, motivation, reconnaissance capabilities, etc.,
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which are related on both sides with numerical values, or simply as "superior" or
"inferior." As with the QJM, these values are difficult to obtain a priori.
A limitation of the COFM lies in rather rigid adherence to the computation.
For instance, if the margin drops below a predetermined value, doctrine says that
action must be taken to enhance the margin or else the mission will be at too
severe a risk. In Western eyes, such a heavy a reliance on the statistical nature of
combat is excessive.
G. RELEVANCE TO FURTHER CURRICULUM COURSES
In Chapter V, Lanchester attrition-based laws were introduced in order to
give the student the skills to numerically evaluate individual or group combat
actions. The formulas were based on the premise that once one side's forces had
ceased to exist, the conflict was over. We then looked at factors in actual combat
that are not given due attention in attrition models. As was shown, rarely is the
case that one side will fight "to the last man." The commander will weigh many
factors both known and unknown: how much loss he can afford to carry, at what
breakpoint is the loss too great, morale on both sides, what future choices are
available, etc. This chapter also introduces various alternatives to attrition warfare
thereby giving the student a more rounded picture both of combat and combat
modeling. Insofar as ground combat is concerned, this chapter along with Chapter
V should be viewed as two parts of a whole, for the concepts of each are
dependent upon the other, attrition based models of ground combat need an
insertion of non-attrition based concepts in order to behave more like reality.
Non-attrition based concepts need the structure and rigor of attrition based
modeling in order to escape the threat of becoming mere speculation and pure
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conjecture. Taken as the second part of the whole, the concepts introduced in this
chapter balance the concepts from Chapter V for further courses in the C3
curriculum.
In OS 3008, Analytical Planning Methodology, and OS 3603, Simulation and
Wargarning, non-attrition concepts are examined hand-in-hand with the Lanchester
laws in order to introduce other forms of combat analysis, namely wargaming,
simulation and field tests and experiments. While the bulk of the material is used
in OS 3008, especially firepower indices, QJM, graphical modeling techniques and
Russian COFM theories, OS 3603 gives the student additional opportunity to
examine the concepts of breakpoints, suppression and mission accomplishment by
using military wargame analysis and planning in actual wargaming scenarios. CC
4003, C3 Systems Evaluation, and CC 4913, Policies and Problems in C', use the
chapter's concepts in examining actual systems and real world C' issues.
H. REVIEW QUESTIONS
1. List in order of importance three factors which affect a commander's
decision to retreat in battle.
2. Why is it difficult for the effects of suppression to be quantified using
current modeling techniques? Why is suppression of concern to
commanders on the battlefield if the results are not readily measurable?
3. Historically, what median percentage of losses have commanders likely
accepted before retreating or breaking an attack? How can this
percentage of losses be useful in the attrition models studied thus far?
4. How can the use of firepower indices be used to evaluate what we
defined in the theory of combat as combat potential? Which of the two
potentials does it most likely measure?
5. What are the limitations of the firepower index modeling technique?
Are these serious limitations?
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6. How does the Quantitative Judgment Model (QJM) alleviate some of the
problems with the firepower index model?
7. If graphical models described in Weir provide no quantitative results,
then what value is there in applying his techniques? Contrast
descriptive (explanatory) modeling with prescriptive (exhortatory)
modeling. Evaluate the usefulness of graphical techniques using the
good model characteristics given in Chapter III of the text.
8. With your understanding of the usefulness and practicality of combat
modeling, analyze the strengths and weakness of the Russian COFM
technique with respect to: decision making, reliability, accuracy,
flexibility, communicability, etc.
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Introduce the student to modem models, simulation and wargames that are
currently in use by the various services. Provide basic information about the
models and explain how the models have been used to make C2 decisions (as
decision aids).
OBJECTIVES:
* Have an understanding of the structure, contents, purpose and use of the




* Understand the principles of Chaos Theory
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27, 1990.
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4. Bolmarcich, J., "On the Distribution of Combat Heroes," MORIMOC
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In this primer, the student has seen several aspects of elementary modeling
(freshman level) and some relatively advanced (graduate level) aspects of the
purpose and use of models, measures of their effectiveness and performance to be
expected from them. Many examples of mathematical modeling techniques (such
as attrition, non-attrition and navy battle modeling) were introduced in order to
understand the principles and theories behind them. To this point, we have not
examined any working models and wargames in use today. While any list of
"current" simulations would be out of date within a year, we can present several
current "standing" models/wargames/simulations and some up-to-date theories and
decision aids in order to provide an introduction to the mechanics of "how the
games are played."
A. JANUS
Janus is a high resolution stochastic interactive combat model used to support
the analysis of hardware system development efforts, employment methodology,
tactics and to assist in the training of troops. Named after the dual-faced Roman
god of beginnings and endings, it was originally developed at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratories and then adopted for use by the US Army Training and
Doctrine Analysis Command The model functions as a Cost and Operational
Effectiveness Analysis tool, one of the categories of model uses listed in Military
Modeling (Hughes, 1989, pp. 227).
The Janus model employs discrete-event simulation to represent the exchange
of fire between two opposing forces. Probability techniques are used to determine
the combat outcomes. Individual combat elements are modeled, not aggregated
units. This allows for the detailed assessment of single weapons' performance in
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combat, as well as the interaction of several weapons systems employed within a
given theater.
The model is highly hardware and software intensive. The system
documentation identifies a requirement for at least a Micro-VAX II minicomputer
with a variety of peripherals and 85,000 lines of Fortran code, in addition to
various utility and database handling routines. Currently there is a version of
Janus(T) at TRAC Monterey on the Naval Postgraduate School grounds.
B. INTERIM BATTLE GROUP TACTICAL TRAINER
The Interim Battle Group Tactical Trainer (IBGTT), also known as the RESA
(Research Evaluation System Analysis) model at the Naval Postgraduate School,
provides an opportunity to train participants on the importance of command and
control in naval operations. The model uses discrete-event, real time, man-
interactive, computer-aided simulation to wargame two opposing naval forces,
Blue and Orange. Emphasis is on Battle Group operations. The model uses
NTDS (Naval Tactical Data System) symbology in order to represent naval forces,
with color enhancement for friendly, neutral and hostile forces. A controller
position oversees the game and may play the role of the Orange Force commander.
Each force has several consoles, both geographic and alphanumeric, which
allow interaction with the system database and controller. Each position is
provided intelligence information from the system database. This information
comes from own force sensors, organic and external. Additional information may
be gained through search with organic surveillance systems and communications
with other players. Thus, failure to search wisely or pass new information
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between players will result in an incomplete picture of the battle situation and
complicate attempts to properly control forces.
RESA, or IBGTT, models the operations of opposing naval battle units,
simulating the actions of aircraft and ships based upon inputs from players.
Command of some individual units, such as aircraft or launch facilities, are subject
to the real-time constraints of logistics requirements (e.g., refueling, rearming,
etc.). These and other factors help to complicate the decision making process. On
the whole RESA, or IBGTT, is widely accepted as an effective tool, offering
trainees an opportunity to make command decisions in an atmosphere of stress and
limited information. A version of RESA resides in the Warlab at the Naval
Postgraduate School.
C. CONTINGENCY FORCE ANALYSIS WARGAME (CFAW)
The Contingency Force Analysis Wargame (CFAW) described in the US
Army Concept Analysis Agency document, "The Falklands Wargame," is a force-
on-force, attrition based model which can be used by the Army Concepts Analysis
Agency to evaluate the reasonableness of operation and contingency plans for joint
forces at the theater level. The model supports testing of hypothesized plans for
littoral warfare scenarios, over different terrain areas as specified by the players.
It is described here because it was extensively used for testing war plans during the
early days of Desert Shield and to a lesser extent, the Desert Storm assault.
CFAW models the interaction of a variety of combat and combat support
functions ranging from intelligence and logistics to ground and air combat. The
combat potential of each opposing element is generated from a database built by
the players prior to the start of the game. Characteristics of each weapon system,
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to include probability of detection target acquisition and kill, are provided during
game preparation. The model uses this information to generate aggregated combat
results on company, battalion or brigade size units at discrete intervals. Resulting
force strengths are compared to pre-set percentage levels in order to determine the
new posture of the two opponents. Should a unit's strength fall below a
predetermined value (e.g., 75%) relative to its initial level, it is automatically
removed from further play.
Players make all command and control decisions. The model requires that
the players must recognize critical decision points and take appropriate action to
redirect their forces. Since the model has the capability to be replayed from any
point, the effects of different decisions can be played and the outcomes compared.
However, the model is highly probabilistic, thus a particular decision will not have
identical results each time the model is played under identical decisions and
actions.
D. CHAOS THEORY
Chaos theory is one of the latest theories with C2 implications being applied
to combat analysis by military analysts. In their paper, "Chaos And Command:
Contemporary Science and Leadership in the Nelson style," Robert Artigiani and
Michael Gaffney examine the highly successful leadership style of the English
Admiral Horatio Nelson within the context of chaos theory. The paper examines
how a leader can instill a common idea of how a battle should be fought and then
give his subordinate commanders sweeping authority to exercise their initiative as
they see fit in order to accomplish the objectives of the battle. This "chaotic" style
of leadership proved to be very successful for Admiral Nelson and his "band of
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brothers" in their various battles. It is a new and unique application of chaos
theory to help think about combat, command and decision making.
E. DECISION AIDS
While decision aids have been used for many years to support tactical
decision making, the complexity of the models used has evolved considerably
from the days when a maneuvering board was the primary tool aboard naval
vessels and aircraft. Microcomputers and database management systems have led
to the development of computer-based decision support systems which enable
commanders to integrate large volumes of information.
Several students at the Naval Postgraduate School have developed decision
aids in theses. For instance, Professor Donald Gaver describes three decision aids
in his article, "Naval Tactical Decisions Under Uncertainty: Some Case Studies."
NPS students applied probability and statistical methods to assess such decisions
as target selection, ranging and radar employment.
Assigned readings help illustrate other attempts at creating or modifying
decision aids to model combat or other factors involved with combat. In his paper,
"On the Distribution of Combat Heroes," J. J. Bolmarcich examined what may be
called "the theory of the expert." He found that in a cursory examination of two
historical examples of combat kills per combatant, a trend appeared where a few of
the combatants achieved the majority of the kills while the majority of the
remaining combatants achieved little or no kills. He wondered that if an athlete
can improve his or her performance by practice and experience, could not a
combatant become more skilled and adept at combat over time? In order to try and
verify his supposition, he used the Multivariate Homogeneous Polya Distribution
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scheme as a decision aid to model combat kills in five cases: US Navy and US Air
Force air-to-air kills in Vietnam, US Submarine kills of Japanese ships in World
War 1I, German U-boat kills of Allied ships in World War II and Israeli tank kills
of Arab tanks in the 1973 War. Through the use of the Basic Polya Urn
Mechanism, Bolmarcich shows that balls, randomly tossed into a number of urns
will tend to accumulate more in a just few of the urns. The probability
calculations were then applied to the case studies by likening the balls to kills and
urns to combatants. Additionally, Bolmarcich utilized the Boze-Einstein equation
which describes a natural phenomenon of "capture" in physics as the neutral or
natural amount of effect of past success on future success. His results showed a
definite relationship between combat experience and number of kills.
James Dunnigan is a commercial wargamer who has an enormous amount of
experience concerning both weapon and human performance in historical battles.
His paper, "Inserting the Human Factors into Combat Models," lists his
conclusions regarding the effects of human factors and how to treat them in
models. He asserts that human factors, such as experience, training, fatigue, etc.,
are crucial to realistic combat modeling and can Le successfully modeled. Most of
these models are based upon historical analysis of battles. Additionally, he
provides some examples of commercial software that can be adapted to include
human factors.
Another Dunnigan paper, "The Failure Rate of Division Commanders After
90 Days of War," is an examination into the "sacking" of combat leaders
throughout history for failure or incompetence at the outset of war. His research
examines statistics from World War I, World War 1I, Vietnam, the American Civil
War and others.
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George Schecter, James Richards and Henry Romberg presented their paper,
"Tactical Deterrent Effects Model" at the MORS mini-symposium in 1989. It is
one of the few efforts to use data and model the phenomenon of combat
suppression. Specifically, it addresses the effects of mine systems in combined
arms engagements to yield measures of tactical deterrence.
F. RELEVANCE TO FURTHER CURRICULUM COURSES
Theories, modeling techniques, measures of effectiveness, etc., all affect
successful analysis. Models/wargames/simulations must be designed and crafted
in such a way as to provide the best data, advice and vicarious experience for the
commander and his forces. It is up to the combat modeler to do that, but general
statements about analysis or abstract models of combat phenomena are limited in
their value. In this chapter, we have shifted from the general and abstract to a few
examples that are both current and slightly more specific.
These actual working military models/wargames/simulations and some recent
"grand-scale" theories of command in combat show some specific characteristics
of models and statistical studies with emphasis oi combat decision making and the
commander/staff perspective. Throughout the Joint Command, Control and
Communications curriculum, numerous models and studies will be presented,
examined, tested and in some cases plqyed. Although the specific
models/wargames/simulations will change and be updated and improved due to
changing priorities, different instructors and curriculum objectives, here is a list of
some of the "larger" models used in courses within the curriculum:
OS 3603: Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS)
Janus (T)
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CC 4003: Research Evaluation System Analysis (RESA),
Tactical Tic-Tac-Toe (T4),
Headquarters Effectiveness Assessment Tool (HEAT),Coordination in Hierarchical Information Processing Structures
(CHIPS)
This list is only of models actually "played" by students. A complete list of
models/wargames/simulations studied and examined in the curriculum would be
too lengthy for inclusion here and quickly become outdated.
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IX. COMMAND AND CONTROL SUMMARY REMARKS
AIM:
Relate this course's concepts to the study of command and control. Ensure
the student recognizes the strength and limitations of combat modeling techniques
and analysis of results as an aid in the accomplishment of combat missions and
objectives. Summarize the relationships previously presented between the course
in combat modeling to future courses to be taken in the Joint Command, Control
and Communications Curriculum.
OBJECTIVES:
* Relate command and control to a decision process
* Discuss the commander's distribution of combat power spatially,
temporally, and functionally
Understand the application of combat modeling to the goals of combat
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A. ROLE OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
The purpose of this course has been to give the student a perspective of
combat models based on a theory of combat and a precise, unambiguous set of
definitions for command and control. We will now attempt to draw key concepts
together so that the students of command and control understand role of combat
modeling with respect to other courses in the Joint Command, Control and
Communications curriculum.
No matter which definitions are used to discuss command and control, all of
them say that a command and control system is an the means of a commander's
decision and execution process with equipment, procedures, etc. Recall that in
Chapter II, "command" is a function which deals with organization, motivation,
decision and execution. "Command-control" is the process by which the
commander makes decisions in order to perform his functions.
B. DISTRIBUTION OF COMBAT POWER
The final conclusion from Chapter II was that the commander's actions create
combat power by activating combat potential. The purpose of the command-
control process can be expressed as the commander's ability to create and
operationally distribute his combat power spatially, temporally and functionally in
order to accomplish his mission. An effective command and control process
results in the wise use of combat potential to generate the combat power which
achieves the objectives or aims of the unit in the face of a thinking, reacting
enemy.
The role of combat models is to help the commander examine the situation
before him to help him best distribute the available forces in his command.
Neither a model nor anyone on the commander's staff can replace the commander's
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intuition or estimate of the situation in combat or ignore the importance of this
estimate in historical conflicts. However, a combat model as a decision aid will
provide a commander with additional inforniation to help him assess the situation,
thus allowing him to effectively activate his potential and distribute his combat
power in order to achieve his goals.
C. GOALS OF COMBAT
In his paper, "Command and Control Within a Theory of Combat," Wayne
Hughes proposed three combat goals in order of importance:
"* Achieve the assigned mission;
"* Achieve the mission at reasonable costs;
"* Recognize mission accomplishment in terms of means and ends.
The importance of combat models can be examined from the perspective of these
goals.
In assigning his subordinate a mission or objective, the superior commander
must first assess the situation and determine how many units will be required to
accomplish the mission (how much force must be assigned to succeed). The
superior commander may have his own intuitive feeling for the situation but he
must be able to process intelligence data and other information to determine the
combat potential required.
In contrast to the superior commander, the subordinate tactical commander
executes his orders and completes his assigned mission using a number of "tools":
tactical decision aids, doctrine, his standing orders, his own operation order, and
guidance regarding environmental factors and equipment. The successful tactical
commander will not only arrive at a decision by applying the most appropriate
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decision aid, but will also understand the derivation of the aid so that he may make
corrections to fit his assessment of the current situation.
As pointed out by Robert McQuie (see Chapter VII), most historical battles
rarely resulted in the complete destruction of the opposing force. A commander
faced with achieving an objective wants to be able to determine what "costs" he
will permit in attempting to complete his mission. Again, the commander must be
able to examine the situation and use some sort of guide for determining whether
his assessment of losses (change in potential) is acceptable in the accomplishment
of the mission. If the loss assessment is too great, he must change tactics,
redistribute his combat potential or reassess his original estimate of losses he can
afford. All of the available measures rely on the commander's ability to look
ahead, not so much to "predict the future" but to weigh the odds and determine the
possible outcomes for various scenarios. As the raconteur Damon Runyon once
wryly said:
The race is not always to the swift. The battle is not always to the strong.
But that's the way to bet.
Analysis helps you decide how to "place your bets."
Once begun, the determination of when a mission is finished or whether or
not an objective has been met depends largely on the commander's assessment of
the overall situation. Throughout the later chapters of this text, the results of
Lanchester-type attrition models have been shown lacking in their ability to
account for the effects of such significant concepts as: territory lost or gained,
suppression, maneuverability, domination and surprise. It becomes apparent that
the outcome of a battle often must be measured in terms other than attrition. The
role of the commander is to determine the processes which will help him to
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achieve dominance over his enemy through the effective distribution of his forces
spatially, temporally and functionally.
D. COMBAT ANALYSIS AND THE C3 CURRICULUM
The purpose of this course is not to generate operations analysts who are
experts in creating combat models. Rather, the course was designed to emphasize
the importance of combat modeling in the command and control process and help
students understand which factors determine the extent to which a model is
adequate, in specific situations, to aid decisions and their execution. The course
emphasizes the applicability of different modeling techniques, in different combat
environments, to generate useful decision aids for commanders.
In subsequent courses in C2 Architecture Design and C2 Systems Analysis,
the student will study the applications of combat modeling and analysis techniques
currently used today. In designing a C' architecture, the preliminary goal is to
determine the needs of the commander in order to best design an organization
which will aid him in his decision making and execution effectiveness. A properly
developed organization is key to a commander's ability to motivate and activate his
forces, best distribute the forces and be able to monitor the execution of his
decisions.
Systems design and analysis must be based on achieving maximum system
effectiveness in order to increase the combat power of forces. Models which
evaluate the usefulness and effectiveness of systems in the generation and
distribution of combat power are based on the techniques presented in this text.
Proper model selection and analysis for a system's design and development can
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save the taxpayers the cost of poor systems and prove the need for, and
effectiveness of, good ones.
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